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CHILD WITNESSES AND THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
THOMAS D. LYON & JULIA A. DENTE* 
 
After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford v. Washington that a 
criminal defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him is violated 
by the admission of testimonial hearsay that has not been cross-examined, 
lower courts have overturned convictions in which hearsay from children 
was admitted after child witnesses were either unwilling or unable to 
testify.  A review of social scientific evidence regarding the dynamics of 
child sexual abuse suggests a means for facilitating the fair receipt of 
children’s evidence.  Courts should hold that defendants have forfeited their 
confrontation rights if they exploited a child’s vulnerabilities such that they 
could reasonably anticipate that the child would be unavailable to testify.  
Exploitation includes choosing victims on the basis of their filial 
dependency, their vulnerability, or their immaturity, as well as taking 
actions that create or accentuate those vulnerabilities. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Waddell,1 a seven-year-old child named J.M.J. disclosed 
 
* Thomas D. Lyon, J.D., Ph.D. is the Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Guirado Chair in Law 
and Psychology at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law.  Julia A. 
Dente is an attorney in the Commercial Litigation Department in-house at Southern 
California Edison.  This paper has benefited from the first author’s work with several groups 
of attorneys on amicus briefs: American Psychological Association, National Association of 
Counsel for Children, American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, and 
California Professional Society on the Abuse of Children in Support of Respondent, Marion 
R. Stogner v. California (2003); National Association of Counsel for Children in Support of 
Respondents, Adrian Martell Davis v. Washington, Hershel Hammon v. Indiana (2007); 
National Association of Counsel for Children and American Professional Society on the 
Abuse of Children in Support of Respondent, Giles v. California (2008).  We thank Ray 
LaMagna, Kevin Stark, Max Castro, Tracey Chenoweth, Nicole Hebert, Joel Purles, Maya 
Roy, and Abe Tabaie for their research assistance, and Scott Altman, Ron Garet, John 
Myers, Robert Mosteller, Myrna Raeder, Michael Risinger, and attendees at the USC Faculty 
Workshop for their comments. 
1 No. 92,378, 2006 WL 1379576 (Kan. Ct. App. May 19, 2006). 
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sexual abuse to a social services investigator in a videotaped interview.2  In 
the interview, J.M.J. described “sexual intercourse, anal sex, the touching of 
her breast, and touching of [defendant’s] penis.”3  Waddell was J.M.J.’s 
next-door neighbor.  J.M.J. would visit Waddell to watch T.V., to use his 
bathroom, and to play with his puppies.4  She would also visit his daughter 
and granddaughter when they were in his home.5  J.M.J. also revealed the 
abuse to her grandmother, a teacher, a nurse, a day-care provider, and a 
therapist.6  She explained that she had not immediately disclosed the abuse 
because she wanted to continue playing with Waddell’s puppies and 
because Waddell had threatened her with a knife that she should not tell.7  
At trial, J.M.J. refused to testify.  Her videotaped interview was admitted 
into evidence. 
At trial it was also revealed that Waddell had previously abused his 
own daughter.  She testified to eleven years of sexual abuse and recalled 
Waddell’s warning that “she would be sent to an orphanage if she told their 
secret.”8  She also testified that Waddell had taken naked pictures of her 
when she was a child.9  Waddell admitted abusing his daughter, but 
emphasized that it was “nonforcible.”10  He also admitted taking naked 
pictures, but asserted that she was seventeen and that she had “volunteered 
to be a photography model.”11  A picture of a naked young girl was found 
in the defendant’s bedroom,12 and J.M.J. reported that Waddell showed her 
a picture of a naked child.13  Waddell denied abusing J.M.J. 
The jury convicted Waddell, but his conviction was overturned 
because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington.14  The 
appellate court held that because J.M.J. refused to testify and because her 
videotaped statement to a social services investigator constituted 
testimonial hearsay, admitting the videotape violated the defendant’s 
constitutional right to cross-examine J.M.J.15  The fact that the trial court 
had admitted the videotape only after assessing its reliability mattered 
 
2 Id. at *1–3. 
3 Id. at *2. 
4 Id. at *1, *4. 
5 Id. at *9. 
6 Id. at *1–3. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at *3. 
9 Id. at *4. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at *3. 
13 Id. at *2. 
14 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
15 Waddell, 2006 WL 1379576, at *9. 
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naught,16 because Crawford emphasized that a defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause right to confront witnesses was a procedural right, rendering the 
reliability of the videotape irrelevant.  Because the videotaped interview 
was central to the state’s case, the error could not be considered harmless 
and the conviction was overturned.17 
Waddell is one of many cases around the country in which criminal 
convictions have been overturned because children’s out-of-court 
statements were admitted after they failed to testify.18  These cases include 
allegations of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and domestic violence, the 
types of cases in which child witnesses are most often called to testify.19  
Typically, children’s statements were admitted after the trial courts found 
the children unavailable to testify and assessed the statements’ reliability 
under special hearsay exceptions for children’s complaints.  Most states 
have such exceptions, which were promulgated to address the difficulties of 
proving child abuse while remaining mindful of the need for individualized 
assessments of the trustworthiness of children’s reports.20 
Crawford radically altered the treatment of hearsay under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.21  In Crawford, the Court 
held that a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights are violated by the 
admission of testimonial hearsay that has not been cross-examined.  
“Testimonial hearsay” includes statements “in which state actors are 
involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain 
evidence for trial.”22  Unless an emergency exists, many if not most 
statements to government officials are likely to be considered testimonial.  
Statements made to social workers and the police when they interview 
children during investigations of alleged child abuse and domestic violence 
are usually deemed testimonial.  Testimonial hearsay also includes most 
statements made to agents of the police. 
In many cases involving child witnesses, children are interviewed at 
child advocacy centers by specially trained forensic interviewers who work 
 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at *9. 
18 See infra notes 53–74, 285–302 and accompanying text. 
19 See Gail S. Goodman et al., Innovations for Child Witnesses: A National Survey, 5 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L., 255, 264–65 (1999) [hereinafter Innovations for Child 
Witnesses]. 
20 See NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION 
OF CHILD ABUSE 369–70 (3d ed. 2004). 
21 The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI. 
22 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). 
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closely with social services and the police.23  In Waddell, a social worker 
interviewed the child at a child advocacy center while a police detective 
operated the video camera.  The worker took several breaks, during which 
she consulted with the detective, and when the interview was complete, she 
forwarded the tape to law enforcement.24  At the best child advocacy 
centers, interview protocols are followed, the interviews are videotaped, and 
both social services and the police observe the interviews in order to 
minimize the need for multiple interviews.  Because the interviews are 
recorded, the exact words used by the interviewer and by the child can be 
closely scrutinized for evidence of suggestion, confabulation, or 
misinterpretation.  Ironically, because of the formality and the input 
provided by state actors, the statements are almost sure to be deemed 
testimonial, triggering application of Crawford.25 
One of the few exceptions to the rule announced in Crawford is the 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.  In Giles v. California,26 the state 
sought to introduce against the defendant statements that the murder victim 
previously made to the police.27  The defendant successfully argued that his 
confrontation rights were presumptively denied because he could not cross-
examine the victim at trial.28  However, Giles held that a defendant forfeits 
his right to confront an unavailable hearsay declarant if the court finds that 
he engaged in wrongdoing that was designed to and did in fact cause the 
declarant’s unavailability.29  A majority of the Court expressed the view 
that repeated acts of domestic violence against the declarant should suffice 
to prove that her murder was motivated by a desire to control the declarant 
and render her unavailable.30  The opinion constitutes an unusual 
willingness by the Court to consider the dynamics of a crime in assessing 
the rights of criminal defendants. 
The Giles opinion provides an opportunity to apply the forfeiture 
 
23 Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual Abuse: Why 
Stereotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 239, 
252 (2010). 
24 State v. Waddell, No. 92,378, 2006 WL 1379576, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. May 19, 2006). 
25 See JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, CHILD 
MALTREATMENT, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, RAPE, STALKING, AND ELDER ABUSE 874–76 
(5th ed. 2012) (collecting cases). 
26 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
27 Id. at 356. 
28 Id. at 358–59. 
29 We will routinely use the word “declarant” to refer to hearsay declarants.  Because 
most child witnesses are victims of child sexual abuse, and the perpetrators of child sexual 
abuse tend to be males and the victims of child sexual abuse tend to be females, we will 
routinely use “he” to refer to defendants and “she” to refer to declarants. 
30 Giles, 554 U.S at 377. 
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doctrine to the special challenges facing the prosecution in child-witness 
cases.  Assessing the dynamics of child sexual abuse, we will argue that 
forfeiture should apply if the defendant exploited a child’s vulnerabilities 
such that he could reasonably anticipate that the child would be unavailable 
to testify.  Exploitation includes choosing victims on the basis of their filial 
dependency, their vulnerability, or their immaturity.  Exploitation also 
includes taking actions that create or accentuate those vulnerabilities. 
Section II explores how Crawford altered the prosecution of child 
abuse.  Section III describes the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the 
Confrontation Clause and discusses how a majority of the Court exhibited a 
willingness to consider the dynamics of abuse in applying the forfeiture 
doctrine.  Section IV describes the dynamics of child sexual abuse and how 
perpetrators exploit the foreseeable unavailability of their victims.  Section 
V demonstrates how the lower courts have missed the opportunity to apply 
forfeiture to child-witness cases.  Section VI concludes. 
II. HOW CRAWFORD ALTERED THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 
Crawford v. Washington changed the status of hearsay evidence under 
the Confrontation Clause.  Prior to Crawford, such evidence was assessed 
under Ohio v. Roberts,31 which admitted hearsay statements from 
unavailable declarants if they bore “indicia of reliability.”32  Reliability 
could be assumed either if the statements fell within a “firmly-rooted 
hearsay exception” or if they had “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”33  Many hearsay statements by children had to satisfy the 
trustworthiness standard, because they were admitted under exceptions that 
were not firmly rooted, such as the residual exception or special statutory 
exceptions for children’s abuse complaints.  Hence, in Idaho v. Wright,34 
the Court upheld the reversal of a sexual abuse conviction because 
statements made by a two-and-a-half-year-old to a physician were admitted 
under the “residual” exception to the hearsay rule and lacked guarantees of 
trustworthiness.35  The Court held that the Confrontation Clause required 
 
31 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
32 Id. at 66. 
33 Id.  In Roberts and subsequent cases, the Court held that a number of hearsay 
exceptions were firmly rooted, including public records, business records, dying 
declarations, coconspirator statements, and of most relevance to child abuse cases, the 
spontaneous utterances exception and the medical diagnosis exception.  White v. Illinois, 
502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992) (statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and 
spontaneous utterances); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (statements by 
coconspirator); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8 (dying declarations, public records, business 
records, and prior testimony). 
34 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
35 Id. at 827.  The residual exception was IDAHO R. EVID. 803(24) (allowing admission of 
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exclusion of such statements “unless an affirmative reason, arising from the 
circumstances in which the statement was made, provides a basis for 
rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not worthy of reliance 
at trial.”36  The prosecution would have to prove that “the declarant’s 
truthfulness [was] so clear from the surrounding circumstances that the test 
of cross-examination would be of marginal utility.”37  Although the Court 
rejected a procedural requirement that the statements be recorded,38 it 
endorsed an assessment that is facilitated by recording: analysis of the 
spontaneity, consistency, and age-appropriateness of the child’s 
responses.39 
Crawford and its progeny overruled Roberts.40  Crawford emphasized 
that the Confrontation Clause was about procedure, rather than substance: 
The defendant has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.  
Hence, the question is not whether the hearsay is true or false, but whether 
the hearsay declarant could be called a “witness” or not and whether the 
defendant had been given the right to confront the declarant. 
To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination.41 
The Court coined the term “testimonial hearsay,”42 which, as the Court has 
since clarified, is hearsay that has “a primary purpose of creating an out-of-
court substitute for trial testimony.”43  Crawford and subsequent cases have 
held that testimonial hearsay includes most statements made to the police,44 
other governmental officials,45 or agents of the police,46 unless there is an 
 
any “statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”).  This language appears in the 
federal rules (FED. R. EVID. 807), as well as in the evidence rules of many states. 
36 Wright, 497 U.S. at 821. 
37 Id. at 820. 
38 Id. at 818–19.  The Idaho Supreme Court seriously weighed this option.  Of course, in 
future applications of the residual exception to child abuse statements, whether the 
statements were videotaped would remain a valid factor in applying the statutory exception. 
39 Id. at 821–22. 
40 See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007) (Crawford overruled Roberts). 
41 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
42 Id. at 53. 
43 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct 1143, 1155 (2011); see also Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 823, 828, 830 (2006). 
44 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (“Statements taken by police officers in the course of 
interrogations are also testimonial under even a narrow standard.”). 
45 Id. at 53 (“The involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial 
evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are police or justices of the peace.”); id. 
at 55 n.7 (“Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye 
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emergency47 or the primary purpose of the interaction is something other 
than pursuing prosecution.48  If the testimonial declarant fails to testify, the 
defendant is deprived of his right to confront a witness against him.  In 
short, Crawford held that admission of testimonial hearsay from a declarant 
who cannot be cross-examined violates the Confrontation Clause.  
Crawford abandoned any application of the Clause to nontestimonial 
hearsay, and abandoned any attempt by the courts to analyze the reliability 
of hearsay under the Clause.49 
It immediately became clear that Crawford would have a major effect 
on the prosecution of crimes within the family and the home because of the 
frequency with which family members fail to testify.  Crawford itself 
involved a case in which the defendant’s wife was the hearsay declarant and 
failed to testify because the defendant claimed the spousal privilege.  Davis 
v. Washington,50 in which the Court carved out an exigency exception to the 
rule, involved two domestic violence cases: one in which a woman gave 
statements to the police in her home while her husband was detained in 
another room, and the other in which a woman called 911 to report her 
boyfriend’s abuse as he was fleeing the home.51  In Giles v. California, in 
which the Court considered the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, the 
defendant was charged with murdering his ex-girlfriend, and the challenged 
hearsay involved her statements to a police officer complaining of an attack 
after Giles accused her of having an affair.52 
A. FAILED PROSECUTIONS POST-CRAWFORD 
In addition to the Waddell case described in the Introduction, the 
 
toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and 
again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”). 
46 Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2 (“If 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement 
officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 
911 callers.”). 
47 Id. at 822 (“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”). 
48 Id. (holding that hearsay is testimonial when “the primary purpose of the [police] 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution”). 
49 See id. at 823 (holding that the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial 
hearsay); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly 
consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of 
hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements 
from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.”). 
50 Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
51 Id. at 817–19. 
52 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008). 
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appellate reports are replete with cases in which application of Crawford 
led to reversals of convictions in which children’s hearsay had been 
admitted after the children failed to testify.  These are typically cases in 
which the child’s inability to testify was unexpected and in which other 
evidence of guilt convinced the prosecutor to attempt to go forward without 
the child’s testimony. 
In State v. Pitt,53 the four-year-old victim, while living with her mother 
and the defendant, began to resist being alone with the defendant and 
disclosed sexual abuse to her mother.54  She made consistent statements to a 
physician, a psychologist, and a forensic interviewer in a videotaped 
interview.55  The physician found physical evidence of abuse.56  The child 
also disclosed having seen the defendant sexually abuse the child’s five-
year-old cousin, who herself confirmed abuse of both girls in a videotaped 
interview.57  The state presented both girls at trial, but they appeared too 
upset and frightened to answer questions and were declared unavailable.58  
The videotaped interviews of both children were admitted, and the 
conviction was reversed on appeal because the interviews were testimonial 
hearsay.59 
In State v. Noah,60 an eleven-year-old broke down during the 
preliminary hearing.61  Her hearsay was allowed under an exception 
requiring reliability.62  She had told her brother and mother that the 
defendant, a “longtime family friend,”63 had touched her “private spot” and 
recounted seven specific incidents of abuse occurring over several years to 
a social worker and police.64  The Kansas Supreme Court upheld reversal of 
the conviction on the ground that the statements to the social worker and the 
police were testimonial hearsay.65 
In People v. Sharp,66 a five-year-old was found to be unavailable 
 
53 147 P.3d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d on reh’g, 159 P.3d 329 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).  
The case was retried, both girls testified, and the defendant was convicted.  State v. Pitt, 237 
P.3d 890 (Or. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 352 Or. 566 (2012). 
54 Pitt, 147 P.3d at 942. 
55 Id. at 942–43. 
56 Id. at 942. 
57 Id. at 942–43. 
58 Id. at 943. 
59 Id. at 945–46. 
60 162 P.3d 799 (Kan. 2007). 
61 Id. at 802. 
62 Id. at 801. 
63 Id. at 800. 
64 Id. at 800–01. 
65 Id. at 806. 
66 155 P.3d 577 (Colo. App. 2006). 
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because she was “too traumatized.”67  The trial court admitted a videotaped 
statement in which the child disclosed to a forensic interviewer her father’s 
sexual abuse, which was consistent with what she previously had told her 
mother.68  The appellate court reversed the conviction because the statement 
was testimonial hearsay.69 
In In re S.R.,70 a four-year-old was deemed unavailable after becoming 
“hysterical” at trial, but her hearsay was admitted after the trial court 
assessed its reliability.71  The mother had heard the child say, “Do you want 
me to do it to you?” during play, and the victim disclosed that the 
defendant, her uncle, had digitally penetrated her anus.72  The victim later 
disclosed other details of abuse to a forensic interviewer.73  The appellate 
court reversed the conviction on the ground that the forensic interview was 
testimonial hearsay.74 
In several of the aforementioned cases, the excluded statements were 
videotaped interviews with the child.  Hence, under Roberts, it was 
particularly easy for a trial court to review the tape and assess the reliability 
of the child’s statements.  These cases provide the starkest examples of how 
Crawford has changed the reception of a child’s statements when the child 
fails to testify.  The exact words spoken by the child and interviewer were 
available, but because the child could not (or would not) testify in court, the 
recorded statement could not be presented to the jury. 
These cases represent just the tip of the iceberg, because Crawford has 
changed the nature of the cases that prosecutors choose to pursue, rendering 
its full effects invisible to readers of the appellate reports.  Reversals of 
cases in which child interviews were admitted into evidence are likely to 
have deterred prosecutors in two respects.  In cases in which the interview 
provided the most compelling evidence of abuse, prosecutors will have 
dropped charges or watered down charges in exchange for guilty pleas.  In 
cases in which there was other admissible hearsay, prosecutors will have 
proceeded without introducing the interviews.  Neither type of case would 
have led to appellate assessment of whether these interviews were 
testimonial. 
In sum, Crawford has made it difficult to prosecute cases in which the 
 
67 Id. at 578. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 581–83. 
70 920 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), cert. granted, 941 A.2d 671 (Pa. 2007) 
(regarding whether statements to mother were also testimonial). 
71 In re S.R., 920 A.2d at 1264. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 1269. 
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child witness initially reported the crime to a state actor but later is afraid or 
intimidated by the prospect of testifying.  Ironically, in these cases the most 
reliable hearsay evidence is the least likely to be admitted, because 
structured interviews that are captured on videotape are most likely to be 
deemed testimonial. 
B. ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT CRAWFORD 
The Supreme Court has refused to review a series of Confrontation 
Clause cases dealing with child witnesses,75 leading the lower courts (and 
commentators) to come up with a variety of approaches.  One approach is to 
argue that children below a certain (as yet indeterminate) age are incapable 
of making testimonial statements because they do not understand the 
implications of their accusations.76  This position has not fared well in the 
lower courts, particularly when the statements were made to law 
 
75 See Bobadilla v. Carlson, 575 F.3d 785, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 1081, 1081 (2010); Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 143 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 218, 
218 (2008); State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296, 297 (Iowa 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
1655, 1655 (2008); State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Minn. 2006), cert. denied, 127 
S. Ct. 382, 382 (2006); State v. Arnold, 933 N.E.2d 775, 777 (Ohio 2010), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 341, 341 (2011).  But cf. Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 985 A.2d 847, 850 (Penn. 
2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1597, 1598 (2011). 
76 Richard Friedman, whose work was a source of inspiration for Crawford, is a leading 
advocate of this position.  See Richard Friedman, Grappling With the Meaning of 
“Testimonial”, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 272 (2005) (“[S]ome very young children should be 
considered incapable of being witnesses for Confrontation Clause purposes.  Their 
understanding is so undeveloped that their words ought to be considered more like the bark 
of a bloodhound than like the testimony of an adult witness.”).  Most commentators have 
similarly argued for a narrower definition of testimonial when children’s statements are 
considered, usually on the grounds that children do not understand the nature of the legal 
process.  See, e.g., Kimberly Y. Chin, Note, “Minute and Separate”: Considering the 
Admissibility of Videotaped Forensic Interviews in Child Sexual Abuse Cases After 
Crawford and Davis, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 98–99 (2010) (arguing that children’s 
statements, except for those naming the perpetrator, should be nontestimonial); Andrew 
Darcy, Note, State v. Buda: The New Jersey Supreme Court, the Confrontation Clause, and 
“Testimonial” Competence, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1169, 1214 (2010) (arguing that 
children’s statements should be judged nontestimonial); Andrew W. Eichner, Note, 
Preserving Innocence: Protecting Child Victims in the Post-Crawford Legal System, 38 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 101, 116 (2010–2011) (same); Christopher Cannon Funk, Note, The Reasonable 
Child Declarant After Davis v. Washington, 61 STAN. L. REV. 923, 969–70 (2009) (same); 
Jonathan Scher, Note, Out-of-Court Statements by Victims of Child Sexual Abuse to 
Multidisciplinary Teams: A Confrontation Clause Analysis, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 167, 173 
(2009) (same).  But see Tom Lininger, Kids Say the Darndest Things: The Prosecutorial Use 
of Hearsay Statements by Children, 82 IND. L.J. 999, 999–1000 (2007) (arguing that a 
statement should be testimonial if the interviewer anticipated trial use); Robert P. Mosteller, 
Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall 
Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 996–97 (2007) (arguing that statements should be defined as 
testimonial from the perspective of the interviewer, not the child). 
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enforcement or their agents.77  However, the Supreme Court may have 
breathed new life into the argument in Michigan v. Bryant, in which it held 
that the perspective of the declarant is relevant in determining whether 
statements are testimonial.78  Another approach is to find that the purpose of 
the interview was not to create evidence for prosecution, but to protect the 
child or facilitate medical treatment.79  Finally, the exigency exception 
created by the Court in Davis (and applied in Bryant) has been applied to 
cases in which children were conceivably in immediate danger.80 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss these proposals in 
detail.  Suffice it to say that many child-witness statements are likely to be 
characterized as testimonial, even if all of these approaches ultimately 
succeed.  For example, when a child has made an initial disclosure, and 
actions are taken to protect her from immediate harm, she is often taken to a 
child advocacy center to be interviewed by a specially trained child 
interviewer.  The interview will be videotaped, and both law enforcement 
and child-protection workers will observe and provide input (typically from 
behind a two-way mirror).81  The interview will follow an interview 
protocol so that the interviewer avoids leading questions and elicits the 
most complete report possible.  This type of interview is almost always held 
to be testimonial.82  Because of law enforcement involvement, it is unlikely 
to be characterized as medical or protective.  Because a perpetrator has been 
identified and initial steps have been taken to protect the child, it is unlikely 
to be viewed as an emergency.  And because many children are aware of 
the potential consequences of their disclosures, it is unlikely that it will be 
 
77 See State v. Siler, 876 N.E.2d 534, 541–44 (Ohio 2007) (reviewing cases and 
concluding that child’s statements to law enforcement were testimonial, notwithstanding the 
child’s perspective).  
78 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).  On remand from the Supreme 
Court, which instructed it to reconsider its holding in light of Bryant, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that the child declarant’s age was relevant in determining if the child’s 
statement was testimonial.  Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 180–81 (Penn. 
2012). 
79 See, e.g., State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 780 (N.J. 2008) (finding that statements to 
social worker were for purposes of protection rather than prosecution); State v. Arnold, 933 
N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ohio 2010) (finding that some statements at child advocacy center were 
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and were therefore nontestimonial). 
80 See, e.g., Allshouse, 36 A.3d at 178; Robert P. Mosteller, Confrontation in Children’s 
Cases: The Dimensions of Limited Coverage, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 393, 404–05 (2012); cf. 
Christopher C. Kendall, Note, Ongoing Emergency in Incest Cases: Forensic Interviewing 
Post-Davis, 10 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM.  ADVOC. 157, 179 (2010) (arguing that children’s 
statements should fall under the exigency exception when they report intrafamilial abuse). 
81 Theodore P. Cross, Lisa M. Jones, Wendy A. Walsh, Monique Simone & David 
Kolko, Child Forensic Interviewing in Children’s Advocacy Centers: Empirical Data on a 
Practice Model, 31 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1031, 1033 (2007). 
82 See MYERS, supra note 25, at 874–76 (collecting cases). 
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characterized as nontestimonial due to the child’s naiveté.  Ironically, this 
type of interview tends to be the best documentation of the child’s report, 
and the strongest evidence that abuse occurred. 
III. THE FORFEITURE-BY-WRONGDOING EXCEPTION TO THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Crawford and subsequent cases hinted at another possible approach 
when child witnesses are too scared or too young to testify: forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.83  In Crawford, the Court mentioned the concept in passing.  
Justifying its position that the protections of the Confrontation Clause are 
procedural (testimonial hearsay must be subjected to cross-examination), 
rather than substantive (hearsay must be reliable), it noted that forfeiture as 
an exception to the confrontation right makes “no claim to be a surrogate 
means of assessing reliability,” but rather is founded “on essentially 
equitable grounds.”84  In Davis, in which the Court considered a pair of 
domestic violence cases, the Court sought to reassure critics concerned 
about the effects of the holding on domestic violence prosecutions by again 
referring to forfeiture by wrongdoing.  It expanded on the concept by noting 
that defendants “have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that destroy 
the integrity of the criminal-trial system.”85  The Court noted that under the 
forfeiture doctrine, “one who obtains the absence of a witness by 
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.”86 
Both Crawford and Davis cited an 1878 case, Reynolds v. United 
States, the only previous Supreme Court case to give any serious attention 
to the concept of forfeiture by wrongdoing.87  In Reynolds, George 
Reynolds was indicted on bigamy charges for marrying Amelia Jane 
Schofield, who lived with him in his home.88  The sheriff attempted to serve 
Schofield several times at Reynolds’s home.89  On one occasion, he was 
 
83 We have identified only one article focusing on forfeiture in the child abuse context.  
The author clearly disagrees with the position adopted here.  Clifford S. Fishman, The Child 
Declarant, The Confrontation Clause, and the Forfeiture Doctrine, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 
279, 302–04 (2010) (rejecting arguments that pre-crime actions or exploitation of a child’s 
vulnerability should be a basis for forfeiture). 
84 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
85 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006). 
86 Id. 
87 Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878); see also Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 
471–74 (1900) (holding that the defendants did not forfeit their confrontation rights because 
“there was not the slightest ground in the evidence to suppose that [the witness] had absented 
himself from the trial at the instance, by the procurement, or with the assent of either of the 
accused”). 
88 98 U.S. at 146, 148. 
89 Id. at 149. 
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told by Reynolds’s first wife that Schofield had not been there for several 
weeks.90  On another occasion, Reynolds told the sheriff that he would not 
help him find Schofield, and that she would “not appear” in the case.91  The 
sheriff, after several attempts and failed inquiries in the neighborhood, 
never served Schofield.92 
The Court approved admission of Schofield’s former testimony under 
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, concluding that “[t]he Constitution 
does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences 
of his own wrongful acts; it grants him the privilege of being confronted 
with the witnesses against him.  But if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses 
away, he cannot insist on his privilege.”93  Reynolds’s intent to keep 
Schofield from testifying was established by the fact that he failed to offer 
any assistance to the sheriff and in fact boasted to the sheriff that she would 
not appear.94  The only evidence that Reynolds caused Schofield’s 
unavailability was that Reynolds cohabited with Schofield, thus giving him 
privileged access to her whereabouts.95  This was enough for the Court to 
conclude that the burden shifted to Reynolds to demonstrate that he had not 
kept her away.96 
The Court squarely faced forfeiture by wrongdoing in Giles.  In Giles, 
the defendant, Dwayne Giles, was charged with murdering his ex-girlfriend, 
Brenda Avie.97  At trial, the defendant claimed self-defense and testified to 
prior acts of violence by Avie.98  The hearsay at issue involved statements 
that Avie had made to the police responding to a domestic violence call 
three weeks before her murder.  Avie, who was crying when she spoke, told 
the officer that Giles had accused her of having an affair, and that after the 
two began to argue, Giles grabbed her by the shirt, lifted her off the floor, 
and began to choke her.  According to Avie, when she broke free and fell to 
the floor, Giles punched her in the face and head, and after she broke free 
again, he opened a folding knife, held it about three feet away from her, and 
threatened to kill her if he found her cheating on him.99 




92 Id. at 159–60. 
93 Id. at 158. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 159. 
96 Id. at 160 (“Clearly, enough had been proven to cast the burden upon him of showing 
that he had not been instrumental in concealing or keeping the witness away.”). 
97 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 356–57 (2008). 
98 Id. at 356. 
99 Id. at 356–57. 
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the common law at the time that the Bill of Rights was enacted and found 
that hearsay from unavailable witnesses was admissible when they were 
“detained” or “kept away” by the “means or procurement” of the 
defendant.100  Giles agreed with Reynolds that the rationale of the rule is 
that “a defendant should not be permitted to benefit from his own wrong,” 
and added that “[t]he absence of a forfeiture rule covering this sort of 
conduct would create an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, 
intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.”101 
Because murder renders a declarant unavailable, the Court did not 
question whether the causation element of forfeiture was satisfied.  Rather, 
the question was intent.  The Court rejected an approach in which the 
defendant must simply have been aware of the effect of his actions on the 
declarant’s unavailability, which would mean the forfeiture rule would 
apply in all cases in which the defendant murdered the declarant.  Rather, 
the plurality (and the concurrence) held that the exception “applied only 
when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness 
from testifying.”102 
Crucially, Giles acknowledged the role that the dynamics of domestic 
violence may play in assessing forfeiture.103  The plurality opinion 
acknowledged that the domestic violence context in which the case 
occurred was relevant because domestic violence is often “intended to 
dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help.”104  Hence, it may be 
possible to prove that, in committing the crime, the defendant “expressed 
the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the 
authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution.”105  The plurality 
opinion concluded that “[e]arlier abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to 
dissuade the victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant 
to this inquiry.”106  The concurrence argued that such intent is equivalent to 
the “intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser in the classic abusive 
relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help, 
including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process.”107  The 
 
100 Id. at 359. 
101 Id. at 365. 
102 Id. at 359. 
103 Id. at 377. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  The plurality opinion was signed by Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito. 
107 Id. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (“If the evidence for admissibility 
shows a continuing relationship of this sort, it would make no sense to suggest that the 
oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant before he 
killed his victim, say, in a fit of anger.”). 
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dissent argued that mere knowledge, rather than purpose, should be 
sufficient and thus agreed with a possible reading of the concurrence: 
purpose could be “based on no more than evidence of a history of domestic 
violence.”108  A majority of the Court thus believed that a history of 
domestic violence would support a forfeiture finding based on the theory 
that repeated violence is motivated by a desire to exert control over the 
victim. 
A. LESSONS OF REYNOLDS AND GILES 
There are several principles that one can extract from Reynolds and 
Giles that are significant for considering forfeiture in the context of child 
abuse cases.  First, intent can be proven based on the dynamics of the crime 
with which the defendant is charged.  In Giles, five Justices (the three 
dissenters and the two concurring Justices) endorsed the view that a court 
can presume intent based on a pattern of domestic violence.  Two of these 
Justices (Souter and Stevens) have since been replaced (by Sotomayor and 
Kagan), and the new Justices’ views are unknown.  Importantly, however, 
all seven of the Justices who have remained on the Court since Giles 
recognized the importance of understanding the dynamics of the charged 
crime in determining whether forfeiture should occur.  We will explore the 
dynamics of child sexual abuse in order to see how perpetrators intend to 
silence their victims. 
Second, the relationship between the defendant and the declarant is 
important.  This fact was clearly recognized by the Court in Giles, when it 
discussed the unique dynamics of domestic violence because, by definition, 
domestic violence occurs between family members and intimates.  In 
Reynolds, the Court recognized that a relationship and cohabitation equates 
with influence, so that if one proves intent and a means of carrying out that 
intent, causation can be presumed.  Following Reynolds, the lower courts 
have also recognized the importance of the relationship between the 
defendant and the declarant in assessing forfeiture.109   
 
108 Id. at 406 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Montague, 421 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(recognizing that defendant’s prior relationship with the witness, his wife, helped inform the 
court’s evaluation of the nature of defendant’s post-incarceration communication with the 
witness and whether that conduct procured her unavailability); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 
1193, 1197, 1203 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding forfeiture appropriate where defendant paid for the 
witness’s lawyer and shared his counsel with her, and noting that defendant had influence 
and control over the witness through his decade-long intimate relationship with her); People 
v. Pappalardo, 576 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1004–05 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (noting that the close personal 
relationship between defendant and witness, while not sufficient in itself to establish “an 
unlawful involvement in a witness’s refusal to testify,” lends additional weight to the 
conclusion that defendant helped procure her unavailability); see also Mayes v. Sowders, 
1196 THOMAS D. LYON & JULIA A. DENTE [Vol. 102 
Moreover, particularly when there is a preexisting relationship 
between the defendant and the declarant, the lower courts recognize that the 
defendant’s actions need not be threatening in order to influence the 
declarant: cajolery can be as powerful a tool.110  Thus, wrongdoing may be 
established where the defendant promised gifts of value or otherwise bribed 
the witness111 or where the defendant played upon the witness’s sympathy 
and pleaded with the witness not to testify.112  Hence, courts applying the 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule often find that outwardly benevolent conduct 
is evidence for forfeiture where the defendant and the witness have a 
preexisting relationship of trust, affection, or authority.  We will see how 
child sexual abuse perpetrators use positive inducements to take advantage 
of their victims and deter them from disclosing abuse. 
Third, the actions that give rise to forfeiture may occur before the 
charged crime.  It is not necessary that the crime be completed or charges 
filed.  All of the Justices in Giles believed that the defendant’s actions well 
in advance of the charged crime were relevant in assessing his intent.  The 
lower courts have not gone as far, but they have recognized that the actions 
giving rise to forfeiture need not occur post-arrest or post-indictment.113  
 
621 F.2d 850, 856 n.4 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding that there was no evidence that defendant 
procured his cousin’s unavailability, but implying that the close personal and familial 
relationship between defendant and witness would be relevant to a forfeiture inquiry). 
110 See, e.g., Steele, 684 F.2d at 1198–99, 1203 (applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing 
rule where witness had been a prostitute for defendant, eventually lived with him and had his 
child, and defendant hired a lawyer for witness, paid for the lawyer, and had his own counsel 
make arguments on her behalf so she would not have to testify); State v. Hallum, 606 
N.W.2d 351, 357–59 (Iowa 2000) (finding forfeiture on the basis of correspondence between 
a defendant and his brother where defendant advised his brother not to discuss anything over 
the phone, wrote to him “hang in there,” and concluded his letter with “Love ya, bro”); 
People v. Smith, 907 N.Y.S.2d 860, 861 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (applying forfeiture when defendant 
had called victim 300 times from jail, but without evidence that he had threatened harm: 
“[t]he power, control, domination and coercion exercised in abusive relationships can be 
expressed in terms of violence certainly, but just as real in repeated calls sounding 
expressions of love and concern”). 
111 See United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[G]iving something of 
value to a potential witness could constitute wrongdoing.”). 
112 See McClarin v. Smith, No. 05-CV-2478 (DLI), 2007 WL 2323592, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 10, 2007) (admitting witness’s grand jury testimony and applying the forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing doctrine where defendant’s “pleas for sympathy caused [witness] to alter his 
grand jury testimony”); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 747 N.E.2d 659, 660–61 (Mass. 
2001) (upholding defendant’s conviction for willfully endeavoring to interfere with a witness 
where defendant sent sixty letters to his former girlfriend who was the victim of an assault 
by defendant, repeatedly begging and pleading with her to lie for defendant regarding the 
assault). 
113 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:134 
(3d ed. 2007) (stating that intent may exist well in advance of charges being filed); United 
States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 660–61 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding forfeiture where defendant 
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Child sexual abuse perpetrators plan their approaches; victim selection and 
grooming are designed to eliminate the need for post-crime threats. 
Fourth, forfeiture can apply even if the declarant had other reasons to 
avoid testifying.  Neither Reynolds nor Giles considered whether the 
declarants had motives to stay silent independent of the defendants’ 
actions.114  Commentators have argued that a declarant’s independent 
reasons might undermine forfeiture,115 but support for their position is 
lacking.116  Moreover, the lower courts have recognized that declarants’ 
 
killed two witnesses before charges were filed; one had not spoken to the police but had 
confronted defendant about killing his brother and defendant knew he had incriminating 
information); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 667–69 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing United 
States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982)) (“We have never indicated that 
Mastrangelo did not apply to a defendant’s procurement of the unavailability of the 
declarant unless there was an ongoing proceeding in which the declarant was scheduled to 
testify, and we see no reason to do so now.”); cf. Robert P. Mosteller, Giles v. California: 
Avoiding Serious Damage to Crawford’s Limited Revolution, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
675, 695 n.76 (2009) (acknowledging that “threats as part of the sex act” and elicited 
promises to keep abuse a secret may be sufficient for forfeiture in the child abuse context); 
Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The 
Intersection of Competency, Hearsay & Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1019 (2007) 
(“[T]he original threats to the child should be presumed to affect the child’s inability to 
testify at trial under a forfeiture rationale even though the demonstrated tampering occurred 
prior to disclosure.”). 
114 Admittedly, one could argue that this is a point unique to these two cases, both 
because there was evidence, based on the hearsay itself, that the declarants were willing to 
testify (in Reynolds, the declarant had previously testified against the defendant, and in 
Giles, the declarant had called the police against the defendant), and because the defendants 
made the declarants physically rather than psychologically unavailable.  When the question 
is whether the defendant was responsible for the declarant’s unwillingness (rather than 
inability) to testify, possible alternative explanations for the declarant’s unwillingness may 
be relevant to the causation inquiry. 
115 See James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for 
“Forfeiture” by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193, 1211 (2006) [hereinafter 
Confrontation]; James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Acquiesce in 
Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule 
of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459, 486 (2003) [hereinafter Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing]. 
116 Professor Flanagan argues that United States v. Williamson, 792 F. Supp. 805 (M.D. 
Ga. 1992), vacated, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), is a possible example of a case where a witness’s 
independent reason “severs the link between the defendant’s misconduct and the loss of the 
evidence.”  Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 115, at 486.  In Williamson, the 
court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the defendant procured the witness’s 
unavailability by paying for the witness’s attorney’s fees in part because the witness had 
independent reasons for asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege at trial.  Id. at 486 nn.165–
66.  The court found that the witness asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege because he had 
a pending appeal to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, and had he offered 
self-incriminatory testimony, the benefits of the appeal would be nullified.  Id.  Thus, the 
witness’s independent reasons caused him to assert the privilege.  But, as Professor Flanagan 
notes, the prosecution could not establish that the defendant’s actions would have caused 
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purported reasons for their unavailability are often themselves the product 
of the defendants’ influence117 or simply not credible.118  Extending the 
argument, we will argue that perpetrators should be held responsible for 
their victims’ unavailability when they exploit or cultivate preexisting 
frailties. 
Fifth, forfeiture can apply even if the defendant had other reasons to 
commit the wrongdoing.119  When Reynolds kept his wife’s whereabouts a 
secret, his only apparent motivation for doing so was to prevent her from 
being served.  But when Giles murdered his ex-girlfriend, he was surely 
motivated as much by jealousy as by a desire to prevent her from testifying 
to the prior abuse; her statement to the police notes that he “threatened to 
kill her if he found her cheating on him.”120  Perpetrators obviously abuse 
children because of their sexual interest and not because they wish to render 
 
unavailability even in the absence of the witness’s valid reason for refusing to testify.  Id. at 
486 n.167.  The court held that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate either that there 
was any agreement between the defendant and the witness to keep silent or that the witness 
knew that the defendant was paying his legal fees.  Id.  Thus, this is not a case where the 
defendant’s independent reason for asserting the privilege destroyed causation; indeed, there 
was simply no causal link to destroy in the first instance. 
117 See United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 630 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that a 
witness’s assertions that his earlier statements to police were made while under pressure and 
duress of the government, and that he simply wanted not to be involved were further 
evidence that the witness was scared of defendant).  Courts also face similar causation issues 
where the witness avoids testimony by asserting a privilege, such as the witness’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  When the evidence demonstrates that the 
defendant influenced or coerced the witness’s decision, courts find the defendant responsible 
for the witness’s unavailability.  See, e.g., United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 651 (6th 
Cir. 1975); Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437, 443 (9th Cir. 1964). 
118 The courts are free to regard such reasons with skepticism, and many have done so.  
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 763–64 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting defendant’s 
assertion that he refused to testify for religious reasons); McClarin v. Smith, No. 05-CV-
2478 (DLI), 2007 WL 2323592, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2007) (rejecting witness’s 
assertion that he did not feel threatened by defendant); State v. Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 
358 (Iowa 2000) (finding not credible a witness’s statement that he had not been pressured 
by defendant in any way and that he would refuse to testify even if defendant wanted him to 
do so); State v. Pierce, 364 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Minn. 1985) (rejecting incarcerated witness’s 
claim that he refused to testify because he feared he would be known as a snitch to other 
inmates, and not because of defendant’s threats); People v. Cotto, 677 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38–39 
(App. Div. 1998) (finding a witness’s explanation that he did not want to testify because he 
did not want to miss a parole hearing not credible); People v. Serrano, 644 N.Y.S.2d 162, 
162 (App. Div. 1996) (rejecting witness’s claims that he was not intimidated by defendant); 
People v. Pappalardo, 576 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1002–03 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (finding that witness’s 
claim of amnesia was feigned and that defendant assisted the witness in contriving the plan 
to avoid testimony); see also Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, supra note 115, at 485. 
119 See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996). 
120 See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 357 (2008). 
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them unavailable.  Our argument for forfeiture will not be that perpetrators 
abuse children in order to silence them.  Rather, we will show that the way 
in which they abuse children is designed to maintain their cooperation and 
silence. 
Finally, forfeiture is not limited to cases in which the hearsay 
statements were themselves under oath and subject to cross-examination.  
Historical analysis121 and Reynolds suggested that this was so,122 but none 
of the Justices in Giles expressed this view.  The prototypical hearsay 
statements in child sexual abuse cases are structured, videotaped interviews.  
The child may have been given a child-friendly version of an oath,123 but 
cross-examination is obviously lacking. 
Reynolds and Giles are complementary.  One might read Reynolds to 
suggest that direct evidence of intent must be provided, but, given Giles, it 
is more consistent to assume that the Court in Reynolds believed that the 
strong facts of intent before it were sufficient rather than necessary.  Giles 
illustrates how the dynamics of the charged acts can inform an analysis of 
what the defendant intended, even when direct evidence is lacking.  
Similarly, one might read Giles to suggest that clear evidence of causation 
must be provided (murdering a declarant clearly renders her unavailable); 
but, given Reynolds, it is more consistent to assume that Giles found the 
evidence of causation sufficient rather than necessary.  Reynolds presumed 
causation merely based on cohabitation.  Read together, the opinions 
suggest a flexible approach for considering whether a defendant forfeited 
his right to cross-examine an unavailable declarant. 
Flexibility with respect to applying forfeiture is justifiable for two 
reasons.  First, proof of forfeiture becomes more difficult as the defendant’s 
wrongdoing becomes more successful.  If the defendant keeps the declarant 
off the stand altogether, then she cannot explain her absence.  If the 
defendant successfully threatens the victim, she will be deterred from 
explaining to the court the reasons for her uncooperativeness.124  If the 
 
121 Thomas Y. Davies, Selective Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of Giles’s 
Forfeiture Exception to Confrontation Were or Were Not “Established at the Time of the 
Founding,” 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 605, 619, 649 (2009). 
122 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878) (“The accused was present at the 
time the [former] testimony was given, and had full opportunity of cross-examination.”). 
123 Child interviewers are often advised to elicit a promise to tell the truth.  See Thomas 
D. Lyon, Assessing the Competency of Child Witnesses: Best Practice Informed by 
Psychology and Law, in CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY: A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL 
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 69, 80 (Michael E. Lamb et al. eds., 2011).  Promising is often an 
acceptable substitute for a formal oath when young children testify.  See, e.g., CAL. EVID. 
CODE § 710 (2012). 
124 See United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (“It seems almost certain 
that, in a case involving coercion or threats, a witness who refuses to testify at trial will not 
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defendant is particularly clever and colludes with the declarant, then she 
will provide alternative explanations for her uncooperativeness, which the 
defendant can point to as undermining causation. 
Second, it is important to reiterate that forfeiture is an equitable 
principle: one should not be permitted to benefit from one’s wrong.  From 
the perspective of fairness, intent is more important than causation.  If the 
defendant desired that the declarant fail to testify and took actions to fulfill 
that desire, then the defendant should not be heard to complain if the 
declarant does not testify. 
A focus on intent admittedly conflicts with the forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing hearsay exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
requires both intent and causation.125  However, the forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing hearsay exception is not synonymous with constitutional 
doctrine, because the hearsay exception is concerned with both equity and 
reliability.126  Causation is most important when forfeiture is used as an 
exception to the hearsay rule.  A clear causal connection between the 
defendant’s actions and the declarant’s failure to testify increases the 
reliability of the statement.  If the defendant’s actions are not the cause, an 
alternative explanation for the declarant’s failure to testify is that her 
statements were unreliable and she feared committing perjury. 
Proof of intent should presumptively satisfy a constitutional forfeiture 
claim, but need not suffice as an exception to the hearsay rule.  Forfeiture 
may make it fair to admit testimonial hearsay from an unavailable declarant, 
but the statutory rules regarding hearsay and the defendant’s due process 
rights may still apply to assess the reliability of the hearsay.127  We will 
 
testify to the actions procuring his or her unavailability.”); see also State v. Mechling, 633 
S.E.2d 311, 326 (W. Va. 2006) (“If a victim is too scared to testify against the accused, for 
fear of retribution, the victim will probably also be too scared to testify in any pre-trial 
forfeiture proceeding.”). 
125 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). 
126 Although the Court in Davis stated that the federal rule “codifies the forfeiture 
doctrine,” it emphasized that its holding took “no position on the standards necessary to 
demonstrate such forfeiture.”  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).  The plurality 
opinion in Giles read the intent requirement in the federal rule as “highly persuasive” 
evidence that constitutional forfeiture required intent.  Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 368 
(2008).  Giles did not address the causation issue because murder always renders a declarant 
unavailable. 
127 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 n.13 (2011) (“[T]he Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments may constitute a further bar to admission of, for 
example, unreliable evidence.”).  The plurality opinion in Giles rejected the dissent’s 
argument that confrontation issues could be separated from hearsay issues, but only as a 
means of rejecting the argument that the dying declaration exception is consistent with the 
notion that knowledge-based intent is sufficient for forfeiture to occur.  Giles, 554 U.S. at 
364–65. 
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argue that it is not always necessary that a defendant cause a declarant’s 
unavailability for forfeiture to apply; rather, it is sufficient if the defendant 
exploited the declarant’s unavailability. 
B. FORFEITURE BY EXPLOITATION 
We propose that criminal defendants forfeit their rights to cross-
examine a child witness if they exploit a child’s reasonably foreseeable 
unavailability.  Exploitation includes taking advantage of vulnerabilities as 
well as creating or accentuating those vulnerabilities through one’s actions.  
Child sexual abusers exploit their victims’ vulnerabilities and immaturity.  
Perpetrators choose vulnerable victims, escalate the abuse over time, and 
cajole and threaten children into continued silence. 
Technically, the defendant who exploits a child’s foreseeable 
unavailability need not cause that unavailability.  One can either take 
advantage of preexisting vulnerabilities or create them.  In either case, one’s 
intent is to ensure that the victim will be unavailable.  Practically, 
defendants will usually take actions to guarantee that vulnerable victims 
remain so.  When they take those steps, they have clearly both taken 
advantage of and caused unavailability. 
States should amend their special hearsay exceptions for children’s 
complaints of abuse.  The statutes currently require that, in order to admit 
this hearsay, courts find indicia of reliability and, when the child is 
unavailable, corroborative evidence of abuse.  In order to comport with 
Crawford and Giles, the statutes could additionally require that if the child 
is unavailable and the statements are testimonial, the court must find that 
the defendant exploited the child’s foreseeable unavailability before 
admitting this hearsay.128 
Proof of exploitation will entail an examination of the relationship 
between the perpetrator and the child.  Parents and adult household 
members enjoy authority and private access, as do professionals who care 
for and interact with children.  In extrafamilial abuse, it is important to 
consider the extent and kinds of interaction between the child and the 
perpetrator.  Child interviewers should ask the child about the pre-abuse 
relationship; the progression of abuse; the perpetrator’s statements to the 
child about the abuse and the consequences of disclosure; the child’s 
reasons for disclosing (and, if appropriate, for delaying disclosure); and the 
child’s feelings about the effects of disclosure.  Recipients of the child’s 
 
128 NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, supra note 20, at 369 (“[A] majority 
of states have a special child hearsay exception . . . Whether hearsay is offered under a 
residual or a child hearsay exception, the critical issue is usually whether the hearsay is 
sufficiently reliable to gain admission in evidence.”). 
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disclosure can provide information about the context in which the 
disclosure occurred and the child’s explanations, if any, for delays. 
IV. THE DYNAMICS OF CHILD ABUSE 
Understanding the dynamics of child sexual abuse is helpful in 
applying the principles of forfeiture by wrongdoing to child witnesses.  The 
dynamics of abuse speak to both intent and causation.  Intent is addressed 
from the perpetrator’s perspective, and looks to the process of victim 
selection, seduction, and silencing.  Causation is addressed from the child’s 
perspective, and focuses on immaturity, filial dependency, self-blame, and 
secrecy.  Although the focus here is on sexual abuse, many of the factors 
discussed here also keep child witnesses to other crimes off the stand.129 
There are several sources of information regarding the nature of child 
sexual abuse, including interviews with admitted perpetrators; population 
surveys; and clinical samples drawn from medical contexts, social service 
investigations, criminal investigations, dependency court, and criminal 
court.130 
A popular conception of the molester is a stranger who grabs a child 
off the street.  This type of perpetrator’s strategy for avoiding detection is to 
conceal his identity.  He might threaten the child not to tell, but such a 
threat may carry little weight because the child has no desire to protect the 
perpetrator.  The perpetrator is unlikely to have continuing contact with the 
 
129 See infra notes 304–308 and accompanying text. 
130 Clinical studies have been reviewed in Kamala London et al., Disclosure of Child 
Sexual Abuse: What Does the Research Tell Us About the Ways that Children Tell?, 11 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 194, 195–96 (2005) [hereinafter Disclosure of Child Sexual 
Abuse]; Kamala London et al., Review of the Contemporary Literature on How Children 
Report Sexual Abuse to Others: Findings, Methodological Issues, and Implications for 
Forensic Interviewers, 16 MEMORY 29, 30 (2008) [hereinafter Review of Contemporary 
Literature on How Children Report Sexual Abuse]; Thomas D. Lyon, False Denials: 
Overcoming Methodological Biases in Abuse Disclosure Research, in DISCLOSING ABUSE: 
DELAYS, DENIALS, RETRACTIONS AND INCOMPLETE ACCOUNTS 41, 41–43 (Margaret-Ellen 
Pipe et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter False Denials]; and Thomas D. Lyon, Scientific Support 
for Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE 107, 120–23 (Jon R. Conte ed., 2002).  Population surveys were reviewed by 
London et al., supra, and Thomas D. Lyon, Abuse Disclosure: What Adults Can Tell, in 
CHILDREN AS VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND OFFENDERS: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 
19 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Abuse Disclosure].  Research asking 
child sex perpetrators to describe their modi operandi dates back at least to the 1960s.  PAUL 
H. GEBHARD ET AL., SEX OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF TYPES 12–13 (1964).  A review 
published in 2009 surveyed the results of 19 studies.  Benoit Leclerc et al., Examining the 
Modus Operandi of Sexual Offenders Against Children and Its Practical Implications, 14 
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 5, 6–7 (2009).  An overview of all of the literature can be 
found in Thomas D. Lyon & Elizabeth Ahern, Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse, in THE 
APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 233 (John E.B. Myers ed., 3d ed. 2011). 
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child, and by virtue of the violent abduction, the child does not feel 
complicit in the crime.  The child may fail to disclose the abuse because of 
her immaturity or her inherent sense that she was somehow to blame, but 
from an intent perspective, the stranger perpetrator has acted more out of 
impulse than cunning. 
In contrast, in the typical case of child abuse, the perpetrator is a 
parent, a parent figure, or a familiar and authoritative adult.  The perpetrator 
selects his victim on the basis of immaturity, vulnerability, and private 
access.  The perpetrator befriends the child before he abuses the child and 
introduces more serious sexual acts only gradually, so as to maintain the 
child’s trust and monitor the child’s continuing compliance and 
secretiveness.  Once abuse has begun, the perpetrator maintains secrecy 
through admonishments and occasional threats.  The success of the 
perpetrator’s approach is demonstrated by the child’s failure to disclose the 
abuse immediately. 
A. VICTIM CHOICE: EXPLOITATION OF THE VULNERABLE CHILD 
Virtually all sexual abuse is perpetrated by someone the child knows.  
In Smallbone and Wortley’s survey of 182 child sex perpetrators, only “6.5 
percent of offenders had their first sexual contact with a stranger.”131  
Population surveys confirm that with the exception of noncontact offenses 
(such as exhibitionism), strangers are rarely the perpetrators.132  Similarly, 
criminal samples are made up primarily of perpetrators familiar to the child, 
 
131 STEPHEN W. SMALLBONE & RICHARD K. WORTLEY, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, 
NO. 193, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS AND MODUS OPERANDI 4 
(2001). 
132 Jessie Anderson et al., Prevalence of Childhood Sexual Abuse Experiences in a 
Community Sample of Women, 32 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 911, 
913, 915 (1993) (defining sexual abuse as “exposure, spying, indecent suggestions and 
pornography”; 15% strangers); D. M. Fergusson et al., The Stability of Child Abuse Reports: 
A Longitudinal Study of the Reporting Behavior of Young Adults, 30 PSYCHOL. MED. 529, 
532 (2000) [hereinafter Stability of Child Abuse Reports] (defining sexual abuse as 
“noncontact episodes including indecent exposure, public masturbation by others, and 
unwanted sexual propositions or lewd suggestions”; 29% strangers); David Finkelhor et al., 
Sexual Abuse in a National Survey of Adult Men and Women: Prevalence, Characteristics, 
and Risk Factors, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 19, 22 (1990) (defining sexual abuse as 
exhibitionism and sexual exposure; 40% strangers); Jillian M. Fleming, Prevalence of 
Childhood Sexual Abuse in a Community Sample of Australian Women, 166 MED. J. AUSTL. 
65, 66 (1997) (defining sexual abuse as all experiences of sexual contact occurring before 
the age of 12 with a person five or more years older, irrespective of consent, and all 
experiences of sexual contact occurring between the ages of 12 and 16 with a person five or 
more years older that were not wanted or were distressing; 8% strangers); Daniel W. Smith 
et al., Delay in Disclosure of Childhood Rape: Results From a National Survey, 24 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 273, 278 (2000) [hereinafter Disclosure of Childhood Rape] (considering 
genital penetration and “use or threat of force, as defined by the participant”; 10% strangers). 
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with the most common single type a parent or parent figure.133  Evans and 
Lyon examined transcripts of over 400 children who testified in felony 
sexual abuse cases prosecuted in Los Angeles County over a five-year 
period and found that the defendant was a stranger to the child only 13% of 
the time.134  This is also true with respect to the production of child 
pornography: only 4% of images confiscated by the police were 
photographed by strangers to the child, whereas 37% were photographed by 
parents, stepparents, or other relatives.135 
It is not an accident that perpetrators target children they know.  
 
133 ELLEN GRAY, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 83 
(1993) (“The abusers were people known to the children, for the most part; only slightly 
fewer were actually family members (45.2%) than the proportion who were outside the 
family (54.8%).”); id. at 85 (“They were strangers to the child 13.7% of the time.”); LOUISE 
DEZWIREK SAS ET EL., TIPPING THE BALANCE TO TELL THE SECRET: PUBLIC DISCOVERY OF 
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 24 (1995) (“[T]hese children were typically abused by someone 
known to them.  In fact one-third of the children had known the abusers all their lives.  More 
than one-fifth of the abusers were fathers or father figures.”); id. at 26 (for all but 16% of the 
children, there had been an existing relationship with the abuser); BARBARA E. SMITH ET AL., 
AM. BAR ASS’N, THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE CASES: FINAL 
REPORT 86 (1993) [hereinafter A.B.A. FINAL REPORT] (“The relationship between the 
defendant and the victim in our sample reflects figures comparable to other studies.  Only 
6% of the defendants were strangers to their victims.  The most common relationship was 
that of parent, or a parental figure.”); DEBRA WHITCOMB ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
EMOTIONAL EFFECTS OF TESTIFYING ON SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN 89 (1994) (a majority 
of perpetrators were related in some way to the victim (i.e., intrafamilial cases); the largest 
categories were biological parents (14%), mothers’ boyfriends (14%), and stepparents 
(13%); in only 3% of cases were perpetrators unknown to their victims); Tina B. Goodman-
Brown et al., Why Children Tell: A Model of Children’s Disclosure of Sexual Abuse, 27 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 525, 530 (2003) (“Approximately 47% of the children suffered 
intrafamilial abuse, which was defined as abuse by a parent, step-parent, grandparent, 
mother’s boyfriend or other relative; the 52% of children who experienced extrafamilial 
abuse were victimized by such individuals as teachers, babysitters, neighbors, or in a few 
cases, strangers.”). 
134 Angela D. Evans & Thomas D. Lyon, Assessing Children’s Competency to Take the 
Oath in Court: The Influence of Question Type on Children’s Accuracy, 36 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 195, 197 (2012). 
135 Elaine Silverstrini, Child Porn’s Dirty Secret: Dads Often Behind Bars, TAMPA BAY 
ONLINE (July 5, 2009), www2.tbo.com/content/2009/jul/05/na-child-porns-dirtysecret-dads-
often-behind-lens/news-breaking/ (noting that the Exploited Child Division of the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which operates as a clearinghouse for law 
enforcement to share information about child pornography victims, has identified over 2,300 
of the children featured in pornographic images and videos since 2003, and that 24% of 
victims were photographed by neighbors or close family friends); see also Janis Wolak et al., 
Arrests for Child Pornography Production: Data at Two Time Points From a National 
Sample of U.S. Law Enforcement Agencies, 16 CHILD MALTREATMENT 184, 185 (2011) 
(“Most [child pornography] appears to be produced by child sexual abusers who know and 
have intimate access to specific victims (e.g., family or household members; acquaintances 
such as neighbors, family friends, baby sitters).”). 
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Perpetrators choose victims on the basis of their accessibility; children 
living in perpetrators’ homes or with whom perpetrators work are most 
accessible.  Sullivan and Beech interviewed forty-one perpetrators who 
molested children with whom they worked and found that 15% chose their 
profession exclusively to provide them access to victims; another 42% 
acknowledged that this partially motivated their job choice.136 
Within the group of potential victims, perpetrators often acknowledge 
that they look for the most vulnerable children.  Conte and colleagues found 
that perpetrators “claimed a special ability to identify vulnerable 
children.”137  Vulnerability was defined both in terms of a child’s status 
(e.g., living in a divorced home or being young) and in terms of her 
emotional or psychological state (e.g., a needy child, a depressed or 
unhappy child).138  Forty-nine percent of the sex perpetrators interviewed 
by Elliott and colleagues stated that they targeted children who lacked self-
confidence or self-esteem.139  Beauregard and colleagues noted that child 
sex perpetrators often targeted “a child with family problems, without 
supervision, always on the street and in need of help.”140 
By choosing a victim from among family and friends, perpetrators 
ensure that their contact with the victim will be perceived by others as 
prosocial, and therefore will not arouse suspicion.  This is also true of the 
child’s perception of the perpetrator: the perpetrator is in a position of trust 
and authority, and the child will interpret interest as paternalistic rather than 
predatory. 
B. GROOMING OF THE VICTIM 
Perpetrators emphasize the extent to which they seduce their victims 
over time rather than commit isolated assaults.  Most child molestation 
typically includes attempts to obtain the assent and cooperation of victims.  
The first step for the sex perpetrator is to befriend the child, typically before 
any kind of physical contact is attempted.  Leclerc and colleagues noted that 
child sex perpetrators adopt strategies “that are similar to prosocial 
behaviors which consist of demonstrating love, attention and 
 
136 Joe Sullivan & Anthony Beech, A Comparative Study of Demographic Data Relating 
to Intra- and Extra-Familial Child Sexual Abusers and Professional Perpetrators, 10 J. 
SEXUAL AGGRESSION 39, 46 (2004). 
137 Jon R. Conte et al., What Sexual Offenders Tell Us About Prevention Strategies, 13 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 293, 299 (1989). 
138 Id. 
139 Michele Elliott et al., Child Sexual Abuse Prevention: What Offenders Tell Us, 19 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 579, 581 (1995). 
140 Eric Beauregard et al., A Descriptive Model of the Hunting Process of Serial Sex 
Offenders: A Rational Choice Perspective, 22 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 449, 455 (2007). 
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appreciation.”141  Both intrafamilial and extrafamilial sex perpetrators 
describe spending time with the child142 and giving the child gifts,143 
sometimes introducing children to alcohol and pornography.144  The first 
sexual contact often does not occur for a substantial period of time, 
particularly given the speed with which children, particularly younger 
children, can form attachments to adults.  In Smallbone and Wortley’s 
study, 76% of the intrafamilial perpetrators, 28% of the extrafamilial 
perpetrators, and 39% of the mixed-type perpetrators knew the child for 
more than one year before initiating abuse.145 
The second step is to desensitize the child to sexual touch through 
progressively more invasive sexual touch and talk.  Kaufman and 
colleagues146 found this to be the most-often-endorsed means of obtaining 
the child’s compliance by both intrafamilial and extrafamilial child sex 
perpetrators.147  This approach has several purposes.  The perpetrator can 
test the child’s willingness to acquiesce148 and the likelihood that the child 
will disclose.149  If the child discloses at an early stage of the process, the 
perpetrator can claim that the touch was merely affectionate, accidental, or 
otherwise nonsexual.150  As the abuse progresses, the perpetrator can assure 
the child of the harmlessness and morality of his actions.151 
When the sexual abuser is the child’s parent, the extra attention paid to 
the child not only has the effect of making the child feel special, but also 
 
141 Leclerc et al., supra note 130, at 8. 
142 John R. Christiansen & Reed H. Blake, The Grooming Process in Father-Daughter 
Incest, in THE INCEST PERPETRATOR: THE FAMILY MEMBER NO ONE WANTS TO TREAT 88, 89 
(Anne L. Horton et al. eds., 1990); SMALLBONE & WORTLEY, supra note 131, at 4. 
143 Lee Eric Budin & Charles Felzen Johnson, Sex Abuse Prevention Programs: 
Offenders’ Attitudes About Their Efficacy, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 77, 84 (1989); 
Christiansen & Blake, supra note 142, at 90; Keith Kaufman et al., Factors Influencing 
Sexual Offenders’ Modus Operandi: An Examination of Victim-Offender Relatedness and 
Age, 3 CHILD MALTREATMENT 349, 353 (1998). 
144 Even perpetrators who offend against strangers endorse strategies short of brute force; 
Beauregard and colleagues described the “hunting process” of sixty-nine serial sex 
perpetrators who offended against strangers and found that “[t]hree methods are used by 
sexual offenders specifically against children: seduction/persuasion (13%), money/gift 
(16%), and games (9%).  These methods help perpetrators make contact with the victims 
slowly and to gradually estimate their chance of succeeding in getting the victim involved in 
sexual activities.”  Beauregard et al., supra note 140, at 456. 
145 SMALLBONE & WORTLEY, supra note 131, at 5. 
146 Kaufman et al., supra note 143, at 356. 
147 Reuben A. Lang & Roy R. Frenzel, How Sex Offenders Lure Children, 1 ANNALS SEX 
RES. 303, 307–09 (1988). 
148 Christiansen & Blake, supra note 142, at 92. 
149 Kaufman et al., supra note 143, at 356. 
150 Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 307–08. 
151 Christiansen & Blake, supra note 142, at 89. 
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isolates the child and the offending parent from the other family members.  
Christiansen and Blake found that “[p]otential victims become alienated 
from the mothers because these daughters are placed by their fathers in their 
mothers’ traditional role of confidante, intimate friend, and sex partner.  
Alienation from siblings occurs because of the privileges and special favors 
potential victims receive.”152 
Third, the perpetrator initiates overtly sexual acts.  In part because of 
careful victim selection and preparation, this need not involve violent force.  
In Fleming’s population survey, only 7% of victims recalled actual 
violence, whereas 64% recalled verbal threats (including threats of 
violence), and 72% stated that some form of coercion was used.153  In 
Hershkowitz’s large study of sexual abuse cases investigated in Israel, 
children reported coercion in 30% of the cases, and threats in only 10%.154  
In Lang and Frenzel’s sample, two-thirds of the sex perpetrators “frightened 
the children in some way.”155 
Much of the persuasive power comes from the perpetrator’s status as 
an adult.  Kaufman and colleagues pointed out that adults’ “greater physical 
sizes, statuses afforded by their age (i.e., ‘When adults tell you to do 
something, you listen’), and greater perceived credibility may reduce the 
need for explicit threats to gain victim compliance in abusive sexual 
activity.”156  They found that when comparing adolescent to adult 
perpetrators, adults endorsed fewer strategies for obtaining compliance and 
in particular, adults were less likely to have threatened the child with a 
weapon. 
When perpetrators do endorse strategies for inducing compliance, they 
mention a mixture of bribes and threats, and the strategies are similar for 
both intrafamilial and extrafamilial perpetrators.157  In Lang and Frenzel’s 
sample, bribery was as common as physical force.158  Kaufman and 
colleagues found that the most common form of bribery was giving gifts, 
and that the most common threat—particularly among intrafamilial 
perpetrators—was to prey on children’s helplessness by threatening to “tell 
on them about having sex with [the perpetrator] or by making them feel as 
 
152 Id. at 90. 
153 Fleming, supra note 132, at 5.  Finkelhor and colleagues revealed that men reported 
force in 15% of acts of sexual abuse and women in 19%, but that abuse included noncontact 
offenses.  Finkelhor et al., supra note 132, at 21. 
154 Irit Hershkowitz, Delayed Disclosure of Alleged Child Sexual Abuse Victims in Israel, 
76 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 444, 446 (2006) [hereinafter Delayed Disclosure]. 
155 Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 311. 
156 Kaufman et al., supra note 143, at 351. 
157 Id. at 356–57; Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 310–11. 
158 Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 311. 
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if there was nothing they could do to stop it.”159  Researchers have 
speculated that the efficacy of such a threat is founded on the 
desensitization process: “[V]ictims’ repeated acquiescence early in the 
grooming process (e.g., to nonsexual touch) may lead victims to believe 
that they have granted permission for more intrusive sexual contact.”160 
The fact that perpetrators fail to use force does not mean that they are 
unwilling to use it or incapable of doing so.  Most of the perpetrators in 
Elliott and colleagues’ study stated that if the child resisted, they would stop 
and try to initiate contact later (61%), but a substantial minority (39%) 
admitted that they would then resort to threats or actual violence in order to 
complete the act.161  Perpetrators may also understate their use of force in 
an attempt to minimize the seriousness of their acts.  In Christiansen and 
Blake’s sample of fathers who abused their daughters, less than one-fourth 
acknowledged using threats or physical punishment, but almost half of the 
victims (45%) claimed they had.162 
With respect to criminal cases, prosecutors may be more willing to 
charge when force is involved, as this is likely to be more convincing to 
jurors.  Nevertheless, in criminal samples, abuse without the use of force 
also predominates.  Smith and colleagues, for example, emphasized that “in 
the vast majority of cases, the sexual abuse was imposed on the child by the 
defendant simply by using his/her authority, or stature, as an adult.”163  In 
Sas and Cunningham’s sample of children who testified in sexual abuse 
prosecutions, 30% did not even realize that the sexual act was wrong when 
it first occurred.164 
C. THE EFFECTS OF VICTIM CHOICE AND GROOMING: 
NONDISCLOSURE 
Because of the means by which the perpetrator has selected and 
groomed his victim, disclosure is unlikely.  Population surveys reveal that 
most respondents who report having been abused as children delayed 
disclosing the abuse for more than a year,165 a large percentage had never 
 
159 Kaufman et al., supra note 143, at 355. 
160 Id. at 356; see also Conte et al., supra note 137, at 300. 
161 Elliott et al., supra note 139, at 582. 
162 Christiansen & Blake, supra note 142, at 96. 
163 SMITH ET AL., A.B.A. FINAL REPORT, supra note 133, at 89.  The authors found that 
“the defendant actually overpowered (or took other steps) to inflict the abuse or to further 
weaken the child into submission” in only 12% of the cases and used bribes in only 8% of 
the cases.  Id. at 90, 92; cf. WHITCOMB ET AL., supra note 133, at 91 (53% no force, 33% 
mild force, 5% violent force, 8% threat of force). 
164 SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 26. 
165 Finkelhor et al., supra note 132, at 22 (57% of men and 59% of women delayed more 
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told anyone before the survey,166 and 90% of the abuse was never reported 
to authorities.167 
Obviously, because disclosure is the primary means by which abuse is 
discovered, abuse that is never disclosed to authorities will rarely if ever 
find its way into clinical samples or criminal case samples of abuse.  
Indeed, perpetrators typically admit having had a number of victims whose 
abuse was never brought to the attention of the authorities.168 
However, the extent to which perpetrators succeed in silencing their 
victims in clinical and criminal samples can be assessed by examining 
delays in disclosure.  Clinical samples confirm that delays are common.169  
In criminal samples, delays are common as well.  In Sas and Cunningham’s 
sample, two-thirds of the child witnesses reported having delayed reporting 
more than forty-eight hours after abuse, and one-third delayed more than a 
year after the first time abuse occurred.170 
Further evidence of nondisclosure can be found in the statistics on 
repeated abuse.  If the child fails to report the abuse when it first occurs, it 
is likely to occur again.171  Over two-thirds of perpetrators report abusing 
the same victim over time.172  Charges of repeated abuse are also the norm 
in criminal samples,173 and charges provide a conservative measure of 
 
than one year); Fleming, supra note 132, at 5–6 (83% did not disclose within 1 year); Smith 
et al., Disclosure of Childhood Rape, supra note 133, at 279 tbl.3 (48% did not disclose 
within 5 years). 
166 Lyon, Abuse Disclosure, supra note 130, at 23 tbl.2.1 (13%–60% had never told 
anyone). 
167 Judy Martin et al., Asking About Child Sexual Abuse: Methodological Implications of 
a Two Stage Survey, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 383, 387 (1993); Diana E. H. Russell, The 
Incidence and Prevalence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of Female 
Children, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 133, 142 (1983); Smith et al., Disclosure of Childhood 
Rape, supra note 132, at 279. 
168 Gene G. Abel et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3, 21 (1987). 
169 Lyon, False Denials, supra note 130, at 42, 46–48.  See generally London et al., 
Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 130 (describing a number of studies that have 
found a delay in reporting is common); Mary L. Paine & David J. Hansen, Factors 
Influencing Children to Self-Disclose Sexual Abuse, 22 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 271 (2002). 
170 SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 26, 29.  Goodman-Brown and colleagues reported that 
only 15% of the child witnesses delayed reporting for more than six months, but they 
measured delay from the last time the child was abused rather than from the first time, which 
means that delay was underestimated for children who experienced repeated abuse. 
Goodman-Brown, supra note 133, at 533. 
171 SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 28 (when disclosure was delayed, abuse reoccurred in 
70% of the cases). 
172 Elliott et al., supra note 139, at 586; SMALLBONE & WORTLEY, supra note 131, at 4. 
173 GRAY, supra note 133, at 90 (single act charged in only 39% of cases); WHITCOMB ET 
AL., supra note 133, at 91 (single act charged in only 43% of cases). 
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whether abuse was repeated, because prosecutors often charge only what 
they are most confident they can prove and specifying individual acts is 
often difficult for child witnesses.174 
If the perpetrator has selected a child within his family or under his 
care, he can rely on the natural bonds between child and family to prevent 
disclosure.  The most common factor that predicts delay in reporting abuse 
is the relationship between the perpetrator and the child: the closer the 
relationship, the longer the delay.  This is true in population surveys,175 
clinical samples,176 and criminal samples.177  The relationship also affects 
the likelihood that the child will be inconsistent in her reports and 
ultimately recant the allegation of abuse.178  Indeed, when asked, children 
endorse different rates of disclosure against parents and against strangers.  
By four years of age, children will predict less disclosure of parental 
transgressions than stranger transgressions (when asked what children 
“would” do), and by six years of age, children will endorse this difference 
as a norm (when asked what children “should” do).179  By six years of age, 
children also make distinctions among the recipients of their disclosures, 
particularly disfavoring the reporting of parental transgressions to the 
 
174 See Lindsay Wandrey et al., Maltreated Children’s Ability to Estimate Temporal 
Location and Numerosity of Placement Changes and Court Visits, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 79, 99 (2012). 
175 Four of the five representative surveys that tested for the effects of relationships on 
disclosure found that the relationship mattered, with closer relationships leading to lower 
rates of reported disclosure.  Anderson et al., supra note 132, at 915; Steven M. Kogan, 
Disclosing Unwanted Sexual Experiences: Results from a National Sample of Adolescent 
Women, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 147, 154 (2004); Smith et al., Disclosure of Childhood 
Rape, supra note 132, at 281; Gail E. Wyatt & Michael Newcomb, Internal and External 
Mediators of Women’s Sexual Abuse in Childhood, 58 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
758, 765 (1990).  But see Fleming, supra note 132, at 68 (finding no relation).  Moreover, a 
study examining the same sample as Smith and colleagues found that reporting to the police 
was more likely when the perpetrator was a stranger.  Rochelle F. Hanson et al., Factors 
Related to the Reporting of Childhood Rape, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 559, 566 (1999).  
Three of these studies utilized a multivariate design, which enabled the researchers to control 
for possible confounding by interactions between relationship and other characteristics of 
abuse that might affect reporting.  See Kogan, supra; Smith et al., Disclosure of Childhood 
Rape, supra note 132, at 281; Wyatt, supra. 
176 London et al., Review of Contemporary Literature on How Children Report Sexual 
Abuse, supra note 130.  This modifies the view of the authors’ earlier review of the 
literature.  See London et al., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 130. 
177 SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 27–30. 
178 Lindsay C. Malloy et al., Filial Dependency and Recantation of Child Sexual Abuse 
Allegations, 46 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 162, 165 (2007). 
179 Thomas D. Lyon et al., Children’s Reasoning about Disclosing Adult Transgressions: 
Effects of Maltreatment, Child Age, and Adult Identity, 81 CHILD DEV. 1714, 1720–21 (2010) 
[hereinafter Disclosing Adult Transgressions]. 
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police.180  In laboratory research where children observe a parent or a 
stranger commit a minor transgression (such as stealing a book), children 
are more likely to keep secrets for the parent.181 
If the perpetrator is close to the child’s mother, the mother is less 
likely to believe her child when the child discloses abuse.182  If the mother 
is unsupportive, the child is less likely to disclose in the first place,183 more 
likely to delay reporting,184 and more likely to recant her allegations.185 
Of course, not all parents are positive figures in children’s lives, and 
many perpetrators can expect secrecy from their victims because of fear 
rather than respect.  In their sample of sexual abuse cases tried in criminal 
courts, Sas and Cunningham found that in about half the cases, the child 
had been exposed to domestic violence186 and that “overt threats were not 
necessary [to deter immediate disclosure] if the man had a history of 
violence within the home.”187 
If the perpetrator chooses a child outside his family, but nevertheless 
under his influence, he can develop bonds that make him a father figure.  
Those bonds often extend beyond the child to the child’s family.  Hence, 
the child looks up to the perpetrator and holds him in high esteem.  The 
child is deterred from reporting the abuse for fear of harming the perpetrator 
or those in the child’s family who are close to the perpetrator.  The child 
also has reason to doubt that others will believe his report because they will 
have difficulty believing the perpetrator is a child molester. 
The gradual introduction of sexual acts will increase the likelihood that 
the child feels complicit in the abuse and will thus feel guilt, shame, and 
 
180 Id. 
181 Marcus Choi Tye, Susan L. Amato, Charles R. Honts, Mary K. Devitt & Douglas 
Peters, The Willingness of Children to Lie and the Assessment of Credibility in an 
Ecologically Relevant Laboratory Setting, 3 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 92, 95–96 (1999). 
182 Mark D. Everson et al., Maternal Support Following Disclosure of Incest, 59 AM. J. 
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 197, 200 (1989) (“[M]others were significantly more supportive of their 
children if the offender were an ex-spouse than if he were someone with whom the women 
had a current relationship.”). 
183 Louanne Lawson & Mark Chaffin, False Negatives in Sexual Abuse Disclosure 
Interviews, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 532, 538 (1992) (finding that of the number of 
children with clear medical evidence of sexual abuse, 63% of those whose parents were 
willing to believe that their children might have been sexually abused disclosed whereas 
only 17% of the children whose parents refused to accept this possibility disclosed). 
184 Irit Hershkowitz et al., Exploring the Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse with Alleged 
Victims and Their Parents, 31 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 111, 119 (2007). 
185 Malloy et al., supra note 178, at 165. 
186 SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 62 (finding that 46% of prosecution sample had been 
exposed to domestic violence against mother by intimate partner). 
187 Id. at 114.  One child who denied being threatened answered: “No, but I knew what 
he was capable of.”  Id. 
1212 THOMAS D. LYON & JULIA A. DENTE [Vol. 102 
embarrassment, further deterring disclosure. The more manipulative forms 
of abuse are likely to increase children’s perceptions of self-blame.  If the 
child fails to resist, she is more likely to believe that she consented.  If she 
delays in reporting, she is more likely to believe that subsequent acts of 
abuse were consensual, or at least that her failure to disclose is responsible 
for their reoccurrence.  The child may intuit these beliefs, and the 
perpetrator is likely to encourage them explicitly both to minimize the 
perpetrator’s own responsibility for the abuse and to help maintain secrecy. 
In their sample of criminal cases, Sas and Cunningham found that 
delay was more likely if the child experienced pre-abuse grooming and 
“had been subjected to subtle and non-aggressive techniques to secure 
compliance with the sexual act.”188  Clinical studies also find that 
manipulation is more likely than coercion to lead to a delay in disclosure.189  
Further, the younger the child, the more likely the self-blame,190 and 
children abused by someone within the family exhibit more self-blame than 
children abused by someone outside the family.191  Self-blame has been 
found to delay disclosure.192 
When asked why they delayed disclosing or never disclosed, victims 
report many of the factors discussed above.  In Anderson’s population 
survey: 
When asked what had prevented disclosure, 65% of the victims gave these reasons: 
expected to be blamed (29% of cases), embarrassment (25%), not wanting to upset 
anyone (24%), expected disbelief (23%), not bothered by abuse (18%), wished to 
protect the abuser (14%), fear of abuser (11%), and wanting to obey adults (3%).193 
In Fleming’s population survey: 
When the women were asked what prevented disclosure, by far the most common 
reason given was embarrassment or shame (47/80 [46%]), followed by the belief that 
 
188 Id. at 24.  Conversely, immediate disclosure was likely if “force was used to gain 
compliance with the sexual act.”  Id. 
189 Hershkowitz, Delayed Disclosure, supra note 154, at 446.  Sauzier did not analyze 
percentages statistically, but it appeared that immediate disclosures were more common 
when a perpetrator used force than when he used manipulation.  Maria Sauzier, Disclosure of 
Child Sexual Abuse: For Better or For Worse, 12 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 455, 466 
(1989). 
190 Ann Hazzard et al., Predicting Symptomatology and Self-Blame Among Child Sex 
Abuse Victims 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 707, 711 (1995). 
191 Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review 
and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 164, 170 (1993); Jodi A. 
Quas et al., Predictors of Attributions of Self-Blame and Internalizing Behavior Problems in 
Sexually Abused Children, 44 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 723, 731 (2003). 
192 Goodman-Brown et al., supra note 133, at 534 (showing that children who perceived 
more responsibility took longer to disclose). 
193 Anderson et al., supra note 132, at 915. 
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the other person would not be able to help them (23/80 [23%]), or would somehow 
blame or punish them for the abuse (19/80 [18%]).194 
And in Sas’s criminal sample: 
In order of frequency, their responses were: fear of harm to self or others; fear of bad 
consequences for self (e.g., rejection by parent); concern for family and to protect 
them from disruption; fear of disbelief; never thought about telling; 
embarrassment/stigma; concern for bad consequences for abuser; lack of someone 
trusted to tell; and altruism—enduring abuse to protect other children from abuser.195 
D. OVERT THREATS   
Notably, the discussion thus far has not assumed that perpetrators 
overtly threaten their victims.  A successful perpetrator does not need to 
make any overt threats because the child will be sufficiently motivated to 
keep the abuse a secret.  Perhaps more than any other factor, this 
distinguishes nondisclosure in sexual abuse cases from the classic forfeiture 
situation, in which the perpetrator threatens the victim in order to enforce 
secrecy. 
The percentage of perpetrators who report specifically warning the 
child not to tell varies widely across the studies.  In Budin and Johnson’s 
sample, 25% acknowledged threats not to disclose.196  In Elliott and 
colleagues’ study, 33% acknowledged telling the child not to tell.197  In 
Lang and Frenzel’s study, 40% of extrafamilial perpetrators and 85% of 
incest perpetrators acknowledged telling the child not to tell.198 
Of course, these may be underestimates.  Kaufman and colleagues 
compared what child sex perpetrators admitted in interviews to what their 
therapists recalled from perpetrators’ records (and prior admissions) and 
found that the sex perpetrators consistently underreported their use of 
threats to induce both compliance and secrecy.199  However, victims in 
criminal samples also report perpetrator threats to keep the abuse secret in 
 
194 Fleming, supra note 132, at 69. 
195 SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 27–28. 
196 Budin & Johnson, supra note 143, at 80. 
197 Elliott et al., supra note 139, at 592. 
198 Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 311. 
199 Keith Kaufman et al., Assessing Child Sexual Offenders’ Modus Operandi: Accuracy 
in Self-Reported Use of Threats and Coercion, 6 ANNALS SEX RES. 213, 221 (1993). 
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no more than half the cases (the percentages range from about 25%200 to 
50%).201 
When they do acknowledge discussing disclosure with the child, 
perpetrators report a wide variety of inducements to secrecy.  Perpetrators 
often refer to serious consequences from disclosure.  Sixty-one percent of 
the perpetrators in Smallbone and Wortley told children that the 
perpetrators would go to jail or get in trouble.202  Forty-three percent of the 
incest perpetrators in Lang and Frenzel threatened that the family would 
split up.203  Twenty-four percent of the perpetrators in Elliott and 
colleagues’ study used anger and the threat of physical force.204 
Oftentimes, however, the threats are much milder and simply refer to 
the loss of the perpetrator’s love and attention.  Kaufman and colleagues 
reported that perpetrators most often endorsed strategies that involved 
giving or withdrawing benefits for nondisclosure, such as giving children 
special rewards or privileges, and telling children that the perpetrator (or 
caretaker(s)) would no longer love them if they disclosed.205  Similarly, 
Smallbone and Wortley found that perpetrators endorsed giving children 
special rewards or privileges (21%) and relied on children’s fears that they 
would lose the perpetrators’ affection (36%).206  In Elliott and colleagues’ 
study, 20% of perpetrators endorsed threatening the loss of love or stating 
that the child was to blame.207  Lang and Frenzel found that these sorts of 
threats—expressing love for the child, giving the child special favors, and 
avoiding punishing the child—were more common among incest 
perpetrators than among extrafamilial perpetrators, perhaps because these 
threats relied on the use of parental authority and control.208 
Similar types of threats are reported by victims in the criminal 
samples.  Smith and colleagues found that: 
[W]arnings ranged from pleas that the abuser would get into trouble if the child told 
(or that the abuser would be sent away and the child would never see them again—a 
 
200 GRAY, supra note 133, at 90 (“The victim was told by the perpetrator not to tell 
anyone about the abuse, and threatened with consequences if she did tell, in almost 33% of 
the cases.”); SMITH ET AL., A.B.A. FINAL REPORT, supra note 133, at 93 (“In over one fourth 
(27%) of the cases, the defendant specifically warned the child not to tell about the sexual 
abuse.”). 
201 SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 26 (when children were asked about the first episode of 
abuse, “in half the cases the abuser had warned them not to tell”). 
202 SMALLBONE & WORTLEY, supra note 131, at 5. 
203 Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 312 tbl.4. 
204 Elliott et al., supra note 139, at 582. 
205 Kaufman et al., supra note 143, at 355–56. 
206 SMALLBONE & WORTLEY, supra note 131, at 5. 
207 Elliott et al., supra note 139, at 582. 
208 Lang & Frenzel, supra note 147, at 311–12. 
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powerful message to a young child whose abuser is also a “beloved” parent), to 
threats that the child would be blamed for the abuse (especially troubling were 
children who were told that the defendant’s intimate—the child’s mother—would 
blame the child for “having sex” with the defendant and would thus turn against him 
or her), to ominous warnings that the defendant would hurt or kill the child (or 
someone he or she loved) if they revealed the abuse.209 
Although it might seem obvious that overt threats deter disclosure, the 
evidence is actually mixed.  In her large clinical sample, Hershkowitz found 
that threats increased the likelihood that disclosure was delayed.210  In their 
criminal sample, Sas and Cunningham found that “threats were far more 
common” among children who delayed reporting.211  On the other hand, 
two other criminal samples have not found clear evidence of the effect of 
threats.  Gray did not find a relation between threats and nondisclosure, 
although she failed to look at delays, which is a more sensitive measure.212 
In another criminal sample, Goodman-Brown and colleagues found that fear 
of harm to self or the perpetrator did not predict delays in disclosure, 
although fear of harm to others did.213 
There are a number of reasons why threats may not always correlate 
with nondisclosure.  One problem is that researchers do not always 
distinguish between threats to comply with the perpetrator’s sexual 
demands and threats to keep the abuse a secret.214  Threats to comply 
suggest abuse by force rather than seduction, which is less likely to 
effectively silence a child.  Second, as noted above, threats are only one of 
many means by which perpetrators silence children, and it is likely that 
perpetrators use threats less often when other forces are effective in 
maintaining secrecy.  Third, threats can only be documented based on 
children’s reports (or perpetrators’ admissions), which may lead to 
misestimation. 
It is notable that the subtler methods of exploiting and inducing 
compliance are more consistently found to deter or delay disclosure.  
 
209 SMITH ET AL., A.B.A. FINAL REPORT, supra note 133, at 86; see also SAS ET EL., supra 
note 133, at 91–92 (reporting threats to hurt the child or a third party, harm the mother 
emotionally, or withdraw privileges, and warnings that the abuser would be harmed by the 
disclosure or that the child would no longer be loved by the mother). 
210 Hershkowitz, Delayed Disclosure, supra note 154, at 446. 
211 SAS ET AL., supra note 133, at 114. 
212 GRAY, supra note 133, at 90–91. 
213 Goodman-Brown et al., supra note 133, at 535.  There are three reasons why the 
study may have missed a relation between fears to self and delays.  The researchers could 
not question children directly, id. at 532, whether the child feared harm or not was measured 
dichotomously, id., and delays were measured from the last act of abuse rather than the first, 
id. at 529.  Measuring delay from the last act of abuse underestimates the delay when abuse 
is repeated. 
214 London et al., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse, supra note 130, at 202. 
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Perpetrators who do not have to threaten their victims are most likely to 
enjoy continued secrecy.  The modus operandi of child molesters thus 
demonstrates how a perpetrator both exploits and nurtures children’s 
vulnerabilities.  His purpose is to molest without the danger that the child 
will disclose the abuse.  This both ensures continued access to the child and 
avoids discovery of the abuse.  The efficacy of perpetrators’ methods is 
demonstrated by the facts that most children do not disclose their abuse and 
that the vast majority of abuse is never reported to authorities.  The 
perpetrator reasonably anticipates that the means by which he accomplishes 
abuse ensures that the child will not speak out against him. 
E. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Several concerns might be raised with our depiction of the dynamics of 
child sexual abuse: (1) the data is tainted by false allegations; (2) children’s 
reluctance to disclose abuse is exaggerated; and (3) the focus should be on 
cases that are criminally prosecuted, not on sexual abuse generally.  We will 
address each of these concerns in turn. 
1. False allegations 
Studies in which victims are asked about their experiences are subject 
to the concern that some of the allegations are false.  In child sexual abuse 
cases, the child’s statement is often the strongest evidence that abuse 
occurred.  However, the child may be lying, may have been coached, or 
may have formed false beliefs due to adult suggestion.  Several factors 
minimize these concerns.  First, interviews with admitted perpetrators 
provide convergent evidence for the dynamics of sexual abuse.  Second, 
respondents who describe abuse in population surveys are not subject to the 
sorts of pressures that might undermine child witnesses’ claims.  As noted 
above, population surveys consistently find that of those respondents who 
claim to have been sexually abused as children, only about 10% state that 
their abuse was ever reported to the authorities.215  This reduces the 
likelihood of false positives, because overzealous parents and investigative 
authorities are the most commonly cited causes of false allegations. 
Similarly, only about 2% report that their memory of abuse was elicited 
with the support of a therapist,216 another possible source of false reports.  
Third, even if these samples contain some false allegations, it is not obvious 
that this would undermine evidence that perpetrators are deliberately 
 
215 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
216 Sharon C. Wilsnack et al., Self-Reports of Forgetting and Remembering Childhood 
Sexual Abuse in a Nationally Representative Sample of U.S. Women, 26 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 139, 144 (2002). 
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exploitative.  For this to be the case, false allegations would have to contain 
more evidence of exploitation than true cases.  This seems unlikely, if only 
because false allegations are usually attributed to the unfounded suspicions 
of lay persons, and lay conceptions of sexual abuse likely assume force.217 
2. Reluctance 
Some researchers have argued that children’s reluctance to disclose 
sexual abuse is exaggerated.  They primarily rely on the fact that in clinical 
samples of children questioned about suspected sexual abuse, the disclosure 
rate among children determined to be sexually abused is very high.218  The 
problem with this argument is that clinical samples contain an inordinate 
number of victims who are uncommonly willing to disclose abuse.  The 
most common evidence of abuse is a disclosure.  Because a disclosure is 
what usually triggers suspicion of abuse and a report to the authorities, and 
disclosure to an investigator is usually necessary to substantiate abuse, 
disclosure rates are necessarily very high in substantiated abuse cases.219 
One solution is to identify children whose abuse could be identified 
and substantiated without questioning the child.220  If abused children are 
not reluctant to disclose, then those children should acknowledge being 
abused when directly asked.  Lyon reviewed several decades of research 
examining disclosure rates among children with gonorrhea, most of whom 
had been diagnosed before ever being questioned about sexual abuse.  Less 
than half of the children disclosed sexual abuse when first questioned.221  
Similarly low rates of disclosure have been found in the few studies 
examining cases in which evidence of sexual abuse surfaced before the 
child’s disclosure.222 
 
217 KENNETH V. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 7 (5th ed. 2010), 
available at www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC70.pdf (“For the public the 
‘default setting’ still seems to be stranger abduction.  To them child molesters are sick 
perverts or ‘predators’ who physically overpower children and violently force them into 
sexual activity.”). 
218 Stephen J. Ceci, Sarah Kulkofsky, J. Zoe Klemfuss, Charlotte D. Sweeney & Maggie 
Bruck, Unwarranted Assumptions about Children’s Testimonial Accuracy, 3 ANN. REV. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 311, 322–23 (2007). 
219 Lyon, False Denials, supra note 130, at 43–45. 
220 An additional advantage of these studies is that the evidence reduces the likelihood 
that the allegations are false. 
221 Lyon, False Denials, supra note 130, at 48. 
222 Lawson and Chaffin found that 57% of children with a sexually transmitted disease 
failed to disclose abuse when questioned.  Lawson & Chaffin, supra note 183, at 537.  
Muram and his colleagues found that 49% of children with medical evidence strongly 
indicative of sexual abuse failed to disclose.  David Muram et al., Genital Abnormalities in 
Female Siblings and Friends of Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 
105, 108 tb1.2 (1991). 
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Another solution to the problem with relying on clinical studies in 
order to assess children’s reluctance to disclose is to resort to population 
surveys.  Unlike clinical samples, which enlist participants who already 
self-identified as former victims, population surveys can identify former 
victims who have never previously disclosed their abuse.  As noted above, 
substantial percentages of survey respondents who acknowledge childhood 
abuse report having delayed disclosing or never having disclosed at all.223 
Skeptics argue that survey respondents’ nondisclosure was simply due 
to the fact that they were never asked.224  This may be true, though whether 
they were ever asked is unknown.  Regardless, the surveys provide other 
evidence of reluctance.  First, substantiated abuse is often subsequently 
denied by survey respondents.225  Second, more persistent questioning 
elicits more reports of abuse.226  Third, respondents surveyed repeatedly are 
often inconsistent in acknowledging that abuse occurred.227 
 
223 Surveys may also understate reluctance to disclose to the extent that survey 
respondents are reluctant to tell the surveyor that they were victimized.  If reluctant children 
who fail to report true abuse grow up to be reluctant adults, then the adults who acknowledge 
abuse in surveys are disproportionately those who acknowledged abuse as children, and 
former victims who deny abuse in surveys are disproportionately those who never disclosed 
as children.  Calculating nondisclosure based on the adults who acknowledge abuse may 
therefore underestimate childhood reluctance. 
224 Ceci et al., supra note 218, at 322. 
225 See Jochen Hardt & Michael Rutter, Validity of Adult Retrospective Reports of 
Adverse Childhood Experiences: Review of the Evidence, 45 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & 
PSYCHIATRY 260, 270 (2004).  Hardt and Rutter concluded that “the universal finding [is] 
that, even with well-documented serious abuse or neglect, about a third of individuals do not 
report its occurrence when specifically asked about it in adult life.”  Id. at 270. 
226 See Rebecca M. Bolen & Maria Scannapieco, Prevalence of Child Sexual Abuse: A 
Corrective Metanalysis, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 281, 293 (1999); Wilsnack et al., supra note 
216, at 143 (finding that the percentage of respondents reporting abuse doubled (from 15% 
to 31%) when they asked a greater number of specific questions about sexually abusive 
experiences). 
227 Richard P.W. Fry et al., Interviewing for Sexual Abuse: Reliability and Effect of 
Interviewer Gender, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 725, 727 (1996).  Fry and colleagues 
interviewed female gynecological clinic patients complaining of chronic pelvic pain at two 
time periods, three months apart.  The authors found that 26% of the abuse mentioned at the 
first interview was not mentioned at the second interview (41/155) and that 16% of the abuse 
mentioned at the second interview was not mentioned at the first interview (22/136).  
Although one might suspect that women omitted abuse that was relatively trivial and 
therefore less memorable, the authors found that the “effect is even more striking when the 
reports of severe (contact) abuse are examined.”  Id. at 727.  In their study, Robin McGee 
and her colleagues questioned adolescents from the open caseload of a child-protection 
agency who were substantiated as sexually abused and found that 19% (12/63) denied sexual 
abuse when individually questioned by two researchers.  Robin McGee et al., The 
Measurement of Maltreatment: A Comparison of Approaches, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 
233, 239–40 (1995).  In their population survey of eighteen-year-olds, Fergusson and 
colleagues found relatively low prevalence rates of abuse compared to other surveys and 
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3. Criminal cases vs. sexual abuse generally 
One might argue that since we are crafting a rule to apply in criminal 
cases, we ought to focus exclusively on criminal samples.  However, if the 
goal is to identify what is reasonably foreseeable from the perpetrator’s 
perspective when he abuses a child, one needs to understand abuse in 
general.  As one moves from clinical samples to criminal court samples, the 
children become less representative of abused children in general.  In a 
number of jurisdictions, most substantiated cases of sexual abuse are never 
referred for prosecution.228  If one focuses on prosecution samples, one   
understates the difficulties that child victims have in coming forward.  
Prosecutors reject the cases that are most fit for forfeiture treatment.  
Prosecutors are less likely to file charges when the child is young, exhibits 
reluctance or inconsistency in reporting, and the family is unsupportive.229  
Cases are more often dismissed when the child is young and the abuse 
occurs within the family.230  As a result, cases that go to trial typically 
involve children who successfully take the stand and maintain their 
allegations.231 
Nevertheless, testifying still constitutes a major hurdle for child 
witnesses.  In their study of criminal trials, Goodman and colleagues found 
that children’s greatest fear was of seeing the defendant in court.232  In a lab 
study, Goodman and colleagues conducted a mock trial in which four- to 
eight-year-olds were asked to testify.  Despite their efforts to make the 
 
recognized the danger that their young respondents were not ready to disclose.  David M. 
Fergusson, Michael T. Lynskey & L. John Horwood, Childhood Sexual Abuse and 
Psychiatric Disorder in Young Adulthood: I. Prevalence of Sexual Abuse and Factors 
Associated with Sexual Abuse, 35 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1355, 
1361 (1996).  Three years later, Fergusson and colleagues questioned the same individuals 
when they were twenty-one.  Fergusson et al., Stability of Child Abuse Reports, supra note 
132, at 534.  Remarkably, among the respondents who reported sexual abuse at twenty-one, 
45% had failed to report abuse at eighteen (37/83).  Id.  Conversely, among the respondents 
who reported sexual abuse at eighteen years of age, more than half (54%) failed to report 
abuse at age twenty-one (54/100).  Id. 
228 Theodore P. Cross, Wendy A. Walsh, Monique Simone & Lisa M. Jones, Prosecution 
of Child Abuse: A Meta-Analysis of Rates of Criminal Justice Decisions, 4 TRAUMA 
VIOLENCE & ABUSE 323, 330 (2003) (finding that special programs had higher referral rates, 
but standard child-protection samples referred 40% of substantiated cases to the 
prosecution). 
229 GRAY, supra note 133, at 94–96. 
230 Id. at 111, 114. 
231 See Kathleen Coulborn Faller & James Henry, Child Sexual Abuse: A Case Study in 
Community Collaboration, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1215, 1223 (2000); Gail S. 
Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on Child Sexual Assault 
Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS SOC. RES. CHILD DEV. 1, 80 (1992) [hereinafter Testifying in 
Criminal Court]. 
232 Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court, supra note 231, at v. 
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experiment as comfortable as possible for the children, 25% of the children 
“refused to testify, either by outright refusal or by appearing distressed so 
that the RA judged that the child should not continue.”233 
In sum, even if almost all children who entered the court process 
managed to testify, this would not undercut the argument that a perpetrator 
can reasonably foresee a victim’s unavailability in cases in which he has 
selected, groomed, and admonished his victim to keep silent.  The children 
for whom charges are filed are the tip of the iceberg.  When a child 
ultimately refuses to take the stand, this only surprises those whose 
experience is limited to the cases that come to trial. 
V. FORFEITURE BY EXPLOITATION IN THE COURTS 
The Supreme Court has shown some appreciation of the dynamics of 
abuse.  The Court has noted that “a child’s feelings of vulnerability and 
guilt and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly acute 
when the abuser is a parent.”234  Citing some of the research reviewed here, 
the Court has found that “[u]nderreporting is a common problem with 
respect to child sexual abuse. . . .  [O]ne of the most commonly cited 
reasons for nondisclosure is fear of negative consequences for the 
perpetrator, a concern that has special force where the abuser is a family 
member . . . .”235 
The lower courts have sometimes been amenable to the arguments 
underlying forfeiture by exploitation, but have trod carefully because of 
continuing uncertainties over the scope of the forfeiture doctrine. The 
typical case of forfeiture by wrongdoing involves ham-fisted silencing of 
witnesses through murder and overt threats of violence.236  These cases 
 
233 Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit 
Technology on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions, 22 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 165, 179 (1998).  The authors note the difficulty of ensuring that a large number of 
children would be willing to testify: 
Such pilot testing revealed the necessity of employing staff who could establish rapport quickly 
and well with children, the chance for children to tour the courtroom and answer questions on the 
witness stand before being asked to testify, the opportunity for children to meet and have a 
friendly exchange with the prosecutor and judge before the trial, a chance for children to adjust 
to the courtroom and answer simple questions posed by the judge before the jury entered, and 
maintenance of an emotionally supportive atmosphere by the judge and attorneys toward the 
children.  The critical importance of the children’s parents staying in the courtroom when the 
children testified also became apparent, a privilege often denied actual child witnesses. 
Id. at 177–78. 
234 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987). 
235 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 444 (2008) (citations omitted). 
236 See, e.g., Hodges v. Florida, 506 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Stewart, 
485 F.3d 666 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Rivera, 412 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950 (7th 
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raise only a few of the issues that arise in child abuse prosecutions.  Most of 
the cases cited above in which appellate courts reversed convictions due to 
the admission of testimonial hearsay from unavailable child witnesses did 
not even consider the issue of forfeiture. 
A notable exception is State v. Waddell, the case discussed in the 
Introduction.  The reader will recall that seven-year-old J.M.J. accused 
Waddell, her next-door neighbor, of intercourse, sodomy, and other sexual 
acts.  The state anticipated the girl’s difficulty in testifying, and did what it 
could to either present her at trial or lay the groundwork for admission of 
her videotaped interview.  Before trial, the state had filed “several motions 
designed to provide a careful structure for her courtroom appearance.”237  
Shortly before the trial, a psychotherapist who spoke to J.M.J. observed that 
she “tried to avoid talking about the abuse,” but was willing to draw a 
picture depicting genital touching.238 
The state then made a motion to find J.M.J. unavailable to testify, 
which was denied.239  “During the hearing on her availability . . . J.M.J. told 
defense counsel that she was scared, but said she was not afraid that anyone 
in the room would do anything to her.  She stated she remembered what 
happened, but she did not want to talk about it.”240  As a result, “J.M.J. was 
required to appear at trial, but refused to talk about the events involving 
Waddell.”241 
The appellate court found that the facts of the case did not justify a 
forfeiture finding.  It emphasized that “in forfeiture cases involving threats 
or coercion, the threats or coercion occurred after the events giving rise to 
the criminal charges,” and noted that “there was no evidence Waddell had 
any contact with J.M.J. after his detention.”242  The arbitrary temporal 
limitation prevented the court from considering the ways in which Waddell 
had exploited the child. 
Had the court felt comfortable assessing the relationship between the 
defendant and J.M.J. and the means by which he accomplished the abuse, it 
could have reached a different conclusion regarding her failure at the 
 
Cir. 2002); United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Emery, 
186 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. White, 838 F. 
Supp. 618 (D.D.C. 1993); Devonshire v. United States, 691 A.2d 165 (D.C. 1997); State v. 
Ivy, 188 S.W.3d 132 (Tenn. 2006). 
237 State v. Waddell, No. 92,378, 2006 WL 1379576, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. May 19, 
2006). 
238 Id. at *3. 
239 Id. at *5, *9. 
240 Id. at *9. 
241 Id. at *5. 
242 Id. at *9. 
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availability hearing to testify to her fears and her ultimate refusal to testify.  
As the reader will recall, Waddell was J.M.J.’s next-door neighbor, and 
J.M.J. “played frequently in Waddell’s yard and with his pets. She also 
occasionally went inside Waddell’s trailer.”243  According to Waddell, she 
would come into his trailer unannounced, they had watched television 
together, and she had used his bathroom.244  He testified that J.M.J had been 
mad at him for failing to get her a Christmas present and for not buying her 
a new pet turtle when her old turtle died.245  J.M.J. was also acquainted with 
his daughter and granddaughter, and she visited them at his trailer (while he 
was in jail awaiting trial).246  When J.M.J. first disclosed Waddell’s abuse 
to her grandmother, she said, “‘I still want to play with the puppies, but 
Kenny touched me in my privates.’”247  She also told two other adults that 
she had not told because she wanted to continue seeing the puppies.248 
In subsequent interviews, J.M.J. described more serious worries.  
According to the daycare provider, J.M.J. said that “Waddell put a knife to 
her forehead or throat and threatened to kill her if she told anyone or did not 
come back.”249  In the videotaped interview: 
J.M.J. stated that the first time Waddell touched her, it continued until she slapped 
him and pulled his hands off; then she ran to her grandmother’s house.  J.M.J. 
described an incident where Waddell had a knife in his hand and said he would kill 
her unless she stayed . . . .  J.M.J. said several times that she screamed loudly.  After 
the touchings, Waddell let J.M.J. get dressed and run home.  Later in the interview, 
J.M.J. said she had been outside playing with Waddell’s dogs when he grabbed her 
and forced her inside the house to commit these acts.  She screamed.  He also grabbed 
her when she took over Girl Scout cookies.  When asked whether Waddell touched 
her with the knife in his hand, J.M.J. said, “No.”  At the conclusion of the interview, 
however, J.M.J. spontaneously said Waddell had two knives in one hand and held 
them to her face.  J.M.J. said Waddell would kill her if she did not stay with him.250 
According to J.M.J.’s grandmother, after J.M.J.’s initial disclosure, she 
did not want to go outside because “‘[s]he was afraid he might be outside 
and know she told.’  J.M.J. did not want to even see Waddell’s trailer, so 
[her grandmother] covered up the windows on that side of her house.”251 
J.M.J.’s fears were no less relevant to a forfeiture determination 
because they were attributable to actions taken by the defendant during the 
 
243 Id. at *1. 
244 Id. at *4. 
245 Id. at *5. 
246 Id. at *9. 
247 Id. at *1. 
248 Id. at *1, *3 (school counselor and daycare provider). 
249 Id. at *3. 
250 Id. at *2. 
251 Id. 
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course of repeated abuse.  Waddell’s exploitation of the child was as 
deliberate and as wrongful as any defendant’s actions taken to silence a 
witness after a crime has been committed.  Although many of Waddell’s 
actions were described by the child as violent and forceful, she originally 
described her desire to play with his puppies as the primary reason for her 
delayed disclosure.  Hence, the evidence suggests Waddell utilized a 
combination of positive and coercive inducements in order to continue the 
abusive relationship. 
On the other hand, not all sexual abuse should be subject to a forfeiture 
claim.  The question is whether the perpetrator took advantage of and 
nurtured the child’s frailties in order to successfully commit (and recommit) 
the crime.  We have emphasized the factors that perpetrators use to exploit 
children and effectively delay reporting: (1) a familial or otherwise close 
relationship between the perpetrator and the child and (2) grooming 
behavior by the perpetrator, which includes befriending the child, 
desensitizing the child to touch, using bribes and threats in order to induce 
compliance with sexual acts, and admonishing the child not to disclose. The 
efficacy of the defendant’s exploitation is evinced by nondisclosure, delays 
in disclosure, and inconsistencies in willingness to disclose over time.  
Many of these elements were missing in In re Rolandis G., a case in 
which the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a forfeiture claim.  In that case, 
the perpetrator was an eleven-year-old neighborhood boy who allegedly 
“forced [Von, a six-year-old boy] into a nearby wooded area and threatened 
him with a stick if he did not do what Rolandis wanted.”252  Rolandis made 
Von “pinky swear” not to tell anyone about the abuse.253  Within minutes of 
coming home from the assault by Rolandis, and ignoring Rolandis’s pleas 
to come back outside, Von disclosed the abuse to his mother.254  True, Von 
told his mother that because of the pinky swear, he “did not want her to tell 
anyone else what Rolandis had done.”255  But within ten minutes a police 
officer arrived, and Von disclosed to him as well.256  Even armed with an 
understanding of the dynamics of abuse, a court could reasonably conclude 
that there was limited evidence that the way in which Rolandis chose his 
victim and accomplished the abuse effectively silenced the boy. 
The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that “sexual abusers 
sometimes select children as their victims because children are generally 
more vulnerable to threats and coercion due to their age and immaturity.”257  
 
252 In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 602 (Ill. 2008). 
253 Id. at 604. 
254 Id. at 603–04. 
255 Id. at 604. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 616.  The Colorado Supreme Court has also noted (in a post-Giles case) that 
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However, the court then rejected forfeiture on the grounds that “there is no 
indication that when respondent sexually assaulted Von, his assault was 
motivated in any way by a desire to prevent Von from bearing witness 
against him at trial.”258  The reach of the court’s language is unclear.  It is 
certainly reasonable to doubt that the eleven-year-old who wields a stick 
chooses and grooms his sexual abuse victims.  But if the court assumed that 
sexual motivation for the act undermined forfeiture, then it misread Giles.  
The fact that Giles was a jealous ex-lover did not mean he could not intend 
to silence his victim; such mixed motives did not defeat the forfeiture claim. 
Moreover, in child sexual abuse cases, the question is not whether the 
perpetrator abused the child in order to silence him.  The question is 
whether the perpetrator’s modus operandi was designed to maintain the 
child’s cooperation and silence. 
With respect to the pinky swear, the Illinois Supreme Court held “there 
is nothing in the record to indicate that when respondent extracted the 
promise from Von, he did so in contemplation of some future trial.”259  
Again, the reach of the court’s statement is unclear.  Perhaps it was 
implying that an eleven-year-old fears only detection, but never imagines 
being prosecuted.  If this is so, then it is reasonable to refuse to apply 
forfeiture.  But surely defendants’ threats can be aimed at deterring any 
disclosure, above and beyond disclosures that lead to legal liability, and still 
provide evidence of forfeiture.  Significantly, Giles referred to the 
defendant’s potential efforts to deter the victim from “resorting to outside 
help.”260  The defendant hoped that the victim would not report his abuse to 
anyone; thus, it would be odd to hold that his actions were not intended to 
deter reporting to the police. 
Perhaps the most significant fact about In re Rolandis G. is that the 
child disclosed abuse to a police officer shortly after the first and only 
assault.  The relation between threats and unavailability may be undermined 
by intervening testimonial statements.  This consideration may explain the 
New York Court of Appeal’s uncertainty about forfeiture in People v. 
Johnson.261  In Johnson, the defendant was a fifty-two-year-old pastor 
convicted of intercourse and sodomy with a twelve-year-old girl, one of his 
parishioners.  The abuse was discovered when the mother found sexually 
 
“the manner in which [the defendant] chose his victim” is a valid consideration in forfeiture; 
however, in the case before it, the prosecution did not introduce any evidence of intent, 
solely arguing that the fact of abuse and the fact that the child was traumatized were 
sufficient.  People v. Moreno, 160 P.3d 242, 247 (Colo. 2007). 
258 Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 616. 
259 Id. 
260 Giles v. California, 544 U.S. 353, 354 (2008). 
261 See People v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 967 (N.Y. 1999). 
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explicit letters from the girl to the defendant.  At her mother’s urging, the 
child placed a pretextual call to the defendant that was recorded by the 
police.  The child also testified about the abuse before the grand jury, but 
“[w]hen called at trial . . . she had ‘nothing to say’ and otherwise refused to 
testify.”262  In the recorded conversation, the defendant asked the child to 
“lie so that he would not ‘go to jail.’”263  The court acknowledged that his 
statements could “support an inference of domination or improper 
influence, providing the requisite link to the girl’s eventual refusal to testify 
at trial.”264  However, mentioning the fact that the child had both reported 
the abuse to the police and testified before a grand jury, the court ordered a 
hearing so that the “defendant would have . . . an opportunity to challenge 
the People’s evidence by raising questions as to defendant’s role in securing 
the victim’s unavailability at trial.”265  Hence, the court implied that the 
child’s testimonial statements, which included formal testimony, cast doubt 
on the causal connection between the defendant’s actions and the child’s 
refusal to testify at trial.  Of course, the child’s willingness to testify before 
the grand jury (at which the defendant could not be present) does not 
preclude a finding that her unwillingness to testify at trial (at which the 
defendant had a right to be present) was attributed to the defendant’s 
actions.  Nevertheless, whether and when the child disclosed to authorities 
are certainly relevant factors to the court’s assessment. 
Commentators have gone so far as to claim that any disclosure of the 
abuse breaks the causal link between predisclosure threats and the victim’s 
failure to testify.266  However, if there is a close relationship between the 
defendant and the victim, the abuse continues over time, and the child 
delays reporting, then the victim’s ultimate failure to testify can fairly be 
attributed to the defendant.  The efficacy of the defendant’s actions is 
demonstrated by the delays in reporting.  The child’s disclosure likely 
reflects a fragile resolve; the same factors that increase delays in reporting 
increase the likelihood that the child’s report will be inconsistent over time.  
Recantations are more likely when the perpetrator is closer to the child and 
 
262 Id. at 968. 
263 Id. at 969. 
264 Id. 
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266 Fishman, supra note 83, at 298 (“[T]he defense can argue that, even assuming the 
defendant had threatened or cajoled the child not to report the abuse, ultimately the child did 
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inability to testify.”); Mosteller, supra note 113, at 695 n.77 (acknowledging that defendants 
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reporting by the perpetrator’s threat . . . [and thus] there is no reason to believe the victim 
failed to testify because of that ineffectual threat”). 
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the child is younger.267  Furthermore, although legal doctrine since 
Crawford treats a child’s testimonial hearsay as equivalent to testimony, 
this formal equivalence says nothing about the psychological difference 
between disclosing abuse to a police officer in an interviewing room and 
testifying to abuse in an open courtroom in front of the defendant. 
In assessing whether pretrial disclosures should affect the forfeiture 
inquiry, it is useful to consider the different perspectives of adults and 
children.  When adults report crimes in the face of threats, they probably 
understand that reporting to the police can ultimately lead to testifying in 
court against the defendant.  If they are unwilling to testify, they will simply 
fail to report or refuse to cooperate with the police.  Hence, the fact that an 
adult reports a crime to police may weigh against finding a causal 
connection between the defendant’s prior threats and the declarant’s 
unavailability at trial. 
Even if she does cooperate, an adult’s continuing fears of testifying 
may support a forfeiture claim.  In Ware v. Harry,268 a post-Giles case, an 
eyewitness who described the crime and named the defendant spoke several 
times with the police.  However, the police officers who interviewed the 
witness reported that she was “visibly frightened,” and she repeatedly told 
them that she was afraid to testify.269  The court found forfeiture on the 
basis of threats that were made at the time of the crime.270 
Children have a less sophisticated understanding of the legal process, 
such that cooperation with the police is only weak evidence that they 
anticipate testifying.  They are unlikely to recognize that by talking to the 
police, they are initiating a process that will not be complete unless they are 
capable of taking the stand and testifying against the defendant in the 
defendant’s presence. 
Children’s limited understanding of the legal process has led some to 
argue that children’s statements to the police should not be classified as 
testimonial.271  However, we believe this goes too far.  It is likely that even 
young children understand the role of the police in arresting and 
incarcerating criminals; they know that the police put people in jail.  
 
267 Malloy et al., supra note 178, at 165. 
268 Ware v. Harry, 636 F. Supp. 2d 574 (E.D. Mich. 2008), objections overruled by Ware 
v. Harry, No. 06-CV-10553-DT, 2008 WL 4852972 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2008). 
269 Id. at 586. 
270 Id. (explaining that defendant “had threatened those who had witnessed the killing 
with death if they talked about the incident.  Specifically, petitioner told the witnesses ‘if it 
gets out I know who to go to’ and ‘I know everybody in this house right now . . . [i]f this shit 
go any further y’all next.’”). 
271 Victor I. Vieth, Keeping the Balance True: Admitting Child Hearsay in the Wake of 
Crawford v. Washington, 16 APRI UPDATE No. 12 (Am. Prosecutors Research Inst., 
Alexandria, V.A.), 2004, at 1–2. 
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Researchers have demonstrated that children exhibit an early appreciation 
of the power of the police.  Lyon and colleagues found that even the 
youngest children they tested (four-year-olds) distinguished between 
reporting transgressions to the police and to teachers, and by six, children 
distinguished between reporting transgressions to the police and to parents 
(preferring parents as recipients).272  Moore and colleagues found that “after 
the President, kindergartners view the policeman as the next most 
influential governmental figure.”273 
What children probably fail to comprehend is the complicated process 
by which an arrest leads to conviction.  It is because they do not understand 
the judicial process that young children are likely to believe that the police 
can summarily throw criminals in jail.  Therefore, children’s statements to 
the police could be considered testimonial, at the same time that their 
willingness to talk to the police says little about their willingness to 
testify.274 
In sum, when adults make testimonial statements, their willingness to 
do so is evidence that they are willing to cooperate with the prosecution, 
and that prior threats have not deterred them from coming forward.  Of 
course, it is not conclusive evidence, but it helps to explain why courts 
would look for evidence that the defendant engaged in wrongdoing after the 
declarant’s initial disclosure.  The fact that a young child has reported abuse 
to the police is much weaker evidence that threats have been ineffective.  
Rather, the efficacy of the defendant’s actions in silencing the child can be 
demonstrated through delays and inconsistencies in the child’s report. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The dynamics of child abuse reveal how abusers exploit their victims’ 
vulnerabilities, making it unlikely that the victims will ever take the stand.  
Abusers silence children, and then complain when children are unable to 
speak out at trial.  Our proposal takes into account the dynamics of child 
abuse and the vulnerability of child abuse victims, and it offers an approach 
that is both fair and consistent with Supreme Court doctrine. 
 
272 Lyon et al., Disclosing Adult Transgressions, supra note 179, at 1721. 
273 STANLEY W. MOORE ET AL., THE CHILD’S POLITICAL WORLD: A LONGITUDINAL 
PERSPECTIVE 52 (1985). 
274 With respect to the classification of their statements as testimonial, children are 
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statements to child advocacy center interviewers, medical personnel, and social workers are 
functionally equivalent to statements to the police.  For this reason, there is still room to 
argue that if one adopts solely the declarant’s perspective, children’s complaints of abuse are 
often nontestimonial. 
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A. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL ON PROSECUTION 
Adopting these views of forfeiture will not make it easy to prosecute 
child sexual abuse.  Jurors intuit the frailties of child witnesses that 
researchers have emphasized: younger children have weaker memories and 
are more likely to be suggestible.275  Jurors expect to see medical evidence 
of sexual abuse,276 but even penile-vaginal penetration and sodomy usually 
do not leave physical signs.277  Even when there is medical evidence, it 
rarely points to a specific perpetrator, making the child’s identification 
essential.278  If the child discloses abuse with little emotion, which is 
typical, the jurors will be skeptical, expecting to see tears.279  And if the 
child reports that she didn’t resist, which is also typical, the jurors are less 
likely to convict.280  If the child is twelve or older, male jurors will see 
consent as a good defense, and if they are told not to consider consent, they 
are even more likely to do so.281 
Our proposal will not lead to a flood of child abuse prosecutions 
without the victim.  Prosecutors believe that jurors want to see the child in 
court,282 an intuition that is supported by research suggesting that jurors are 
more inclined to believe child witnesses when they see them in person.283  
There is no evidence that prior to Crawford, prosecutors routinely went to 
 
275 Jody A. Quas et al., Do Jurors “Know” What Isn’t So About Child Witnesses?, 29 L. 
& HUM. BEHAV. 425, 448 (2005). 
276 Susan Morison & Edith Greene, Juror and Expert Knowledge of Child Sexual Abuse, 
16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 595, 608 (1992). 
277 Astrid Heger et al., Children Referred for Possible Sexual Abuse: Medical Findings in 
2384 Children, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 645, 652 (2002). 
278 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824 (1990) (“Corroboration of a child’s allegations of 
sexual abuse by medical evidence of abuse, for example, sheds no light on the reliability of 
the child’s allegations regarding the identity of the abuser.”). 
279 Pamela C. Regan & Sheri J. Baker, The Impact of Child Witness Demeanor on 
Perceived Credibility and Trial Outcome in Sexual Abuse Cases, 13 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 187, 
189, 192 (1998); Barbara Wood et al., Semistructured Child Sexual Abuse Interviews: 
Interview and Child Characteristics Related to Credibility of Disclosure, 20 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 81, 88 (1996). 
280 Thomas D. Lyon, Felony Charges of Child Sexual Abuse in Los Angeles County, 
1997–2001 (2012) (unpublished data) (on file with the author). 
281 Peter K. Isquith et al., Blaming the Child: Attribution of Responsibility to Victims of 
Child Sexual Abuse, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING & IMPROVING 
TESTIMONY 203, 223 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993). 
282 John E.B. Myers et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 
5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 411 (1999) (“[P]rosecutors are reluctant to take child 
sexual abuse cases to trial unless the victim is available to testify.”). 
283 Goodman et al., Innovations for Child Witnesses, supra note 19, at 261 (“[A]cross 
studies, when innovations do affect case outcome, either directly or indirectly, the effects 
appear to be mainly in terms of innovation use being associated with fewer rather than more 
guilty outcomes.”). 
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trial without putting the child witness on the stand.  Evans and Lyon 
examined five years of felony sexual abuse cases tried in Los Angeles 
County before Crawford and found that prosecutors relied on child hearsay 
only 3% of the time.284  Rather, our proposal makes it possible to proceed in 
the relatively rare cases in which there is a substantial amount of 
corroborative evidence, but the child’s statements are necessary to convince 
a jury beyond any reasonable doubt. 
B. EXPANDING THE ANALYSIS TO OTHER TYPES OF CASES   
When children testify in court, it is most often in sexual abuse cases.  
However, child witnesses also appear in physical abuse and domestic 
violence cases.  In a number of cases post-Crawford, appellate courts 
reversed murder convictions in cases where children were the only 
witnesses to murders.  In Bell v. State,285 a woman’s daughters (ages four 
and five) saw her killed.  The younger daughter told police officers that Bell 
(her father) “asked [her mother] for money” and that her mother “emptied 
her purse out on the floor.”286  She then told the officers that “Bell pushed 
[her mother] down over a table, broke the table . . . broke a mirror in [the] 
bathroom . . . [and] used a small knife to put ‘blood on [her mother’s] 
back.’”287  The child’s statements were corroborated by the physical 
evidence—police found an overturned coffee table, a purse with its contents 
emptied, a broken mirror in the bathroom, and multiple knife wounds in the 
mother’s body.288  Both girls were found unavailable after they were unable 
to endure a mock pretrial practice session.289  The conviction was reversed 
because the statements were testimonial.290 
In State v. Siler, a three-year-old reported witnessing his father beat 
and then hang his mother in their garage.291  In response to questioning by a 
police detective, the child stated that his mother was “sleeping standing” in 
the garage.292  The child told how “Daddy, mommy fighting” in the garage 
had scared him.293  When asked “if anyone was hurting mommy,” he 
 
284 Evans & Lyon, supra note 134, at 197 (finding that hearsay was admitted in lieu of 
children’s testimony in 6 of 235 cases). 
285 Bell v. State, 928 So.2d 951 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). 
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responded, “Daddy did.”294  Although officers prevented the child from 
seeing his mother’s body, the child informed the detective that “the yellow 
thing” had held his mother upright in the garage.295  A yellow cord had been 
tied around his mother’s neck.296  When “asked who put the yellow thing on 
her, the child responded, ‘Daddy.’”297  The prosecution also presented 
evidence of threats the father made against the mother and of past incidents 
of domestic violence.298  The conviction was reversed because the child’s 
out-of-court statements were testimonial.299 
In Flores v. State, the defendant’s five-year-old daughter told her 
foster mother and police that after her stepsister “peed on her [own] pants,” 
her mother hit her and “she never woke up.”300  The child refused to testify 
against her mother and the trial court admitted her hearsay after assessing 
its reliability.301  The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the murder 
conviction on the ground that the child’s statements to police were 
testimonial hearsay.302 
These cases suggest that Crawford has affected the prosecution of 
child physical abuse and domestic violence when children were the key 
witnesses.  Prosecution of child physical abuse is often facilitated by 
documented physical injury, and thus may be easier than prosecuting sexual 
abuse, in which medical evidence is uncommon.  However, the perpetrator 
must be identified, and the injuries must be proven to be intentional.  
Because of the privacy afforded people in their homes, the only potential 
witnesses are often family members.  If the father is accused, then the 
defense is likely to be that the mother was to blame, and vice versa.  
Prosecution of domestic violence is notoriously difficult because the adult 
victims—typically mothers—are themselves often (if not usually) 
uncooperative.303  If the mother refuses to cooperate, it is likely that the 
child will be similarly unavailable. 
The dynamics of child physical abuse and domestic violence are sure 
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Virtually all child physical abuse allegations involve parents.304  Domestic 
violence by definition involves assaults by family members.  Spouse 
batterers frequently seek to control their victims, and violence is just one 
means by which they foster dependency.305  When domestic violence 
occurs, there is a high likelihood that child physical abuse is also 
occurring.306  Underreporting of domestic violence by adults is legion.  
Children’s underreporting of physical abuse is comparable to that of sexual 
abuse.307  Future work can explore the extent to which the dynamics of 
physical abuse and domestic violence offer similar explanations for child 
witnesses’ unavailability in these cases.308 
C. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL ON CHILD INTERVIEWING 
The proposed elements of a forfeiture finding encourage a more 
complete interview with the child.  The interviewer should explore the pre-
abuse relationship between the perpetrator and the child; the progression of 
abuse over time; the child’s feelings about the abuse and its aftermath; any 
threats, bribes, or other inducements used by the perpetrator; and the child’s 
disclosure history.  All of these facts are relevant to the determination of 
whether the defendant exploited the child’s foreseeable unavailability. 
Our proposal encourages careful documentation of children’s reports 
soon after the child’s first statements about abuse.  As we have discussed, 
many of the cases in which child abuse convictions were overturned 
because of Crawford involved videotaped interviews that had been assessed 
for their reliability pursuant to special hearsay exceptions for children’s 
complaints of abuse.  By expanding defendants’ confrontation rights such 
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that testimonial hearsay is always disallowed, the Court has discouraged the 
videotaping of formal interviews that benefit from the input and 
cooperation of all potential players, including social services and law 
enforcement.  Hearsay is more likely to be classified as testimonial if it is 
carefully documented, if it is in response to structured questioning, and if it 
is conducted by agents of the government.  However, all of these are 
elements of a state-of-the-art forensic interview and enhance both reliability 
and the ability to assess reliability.309  Videotaping enables viewers to 
assess the exact words used by the interviewer and by the child, whereas 
notes or verbal reports are sure to be less complete and less accurate.310  
When an interview is conducted well, the videotape will reveal appropriate 
instructions and rapport building, the use of open-ended questions, 
noncontingent encouragement, and the child’s free narrative of the alleged 
event.  When an interview is conducted poorly, the videotape will reveal the 
interviewer’s bias, coercion, and suggestiveness on the one hand, and the 
child’s confusion, acquiescence, and misinterpretation on the other. 
Videotaping also facilitates a reduction in repeated interviewing,311 
because the interview can be shared by the different agencies (and the 
different players within the agencies) involved in the child’s case, including 
social services, the police, and attorneys in dependency court, family court, 
and criminal court.  Repeated interviewing increases the risk that the child’s 
story will be distorted by suggestions and confabulation that become 
incorporated in the child’s narrative, making the child’s trial testimony a 
pale comparison to the original report. 
In sum, our proposal accepts the proposition that defendants have a 
right to confront declarants whose words are gathered in anticipation of 
prosecution.  At the same time, it recognizes the reality of child abuse: 
defendants subvert justice not only through overt threats and violent acts, 
but also through exploitation and manipulation of our most vulnerable 
citizens.  When exploitation ensures that a child victim will not testify, a 
finding that the defendant has forfeited his confrontation rights is a fair 
means to let the child be heard. 
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